Jul

17

Posted by : Matthew Wild | On : July 17, 2008

On July 3, 2008, the Antitrust Division conditioned its approval of Signature Flight Support’s acquisition of Hawker Beechcraft’s competing flight support business on divestitures at the Indianapolis International Airport. Signature and Hawker both provide flight support services (also called fixed base operations) to charter and corporate airplanes at 45 and 7 airports respectively across the United States. At the Indianapolis airport, Signature and Hawker are the only two providers of these services. Accordingly, the Antitrust Division required divestiture of one of the two parties’ assets at the Indianapolis airport to a buyer that it approves.

Jun

30

Posted by : Matthew Wild | On : June 30, 2008

According to Reuters, Hewlett Packard Co. received approval today of its $12.6 billion proposed acquisition of Electronic Data Services. Consummation of the transaction would make HP the second largest provider of technology services behind International Business Machines. The transaction is still subject to approval by the EU Competition Commission.

Jun

21

Posted by : Matthew Wild | On : June 21, 2008

On May 28, 2008, the Antitrust Division required divestitures as a condition of its approval of Cengage Holdings’ $750 million proposed acquisition of Houghton Mifflin College Division. Both companies publish college textbooks. The Antitrust Division defined the relevant product market as textbooks in courses on particular subject matters. The Antitrust Division alleged that students had no significant alternatives to new textbooks in these courses because, for example, used textbooks are not consistently available in large numbers. The Antitrust Division limited the relevant geographic market to the United States but did not explain why foreign publishers could not compete effectively. The Antitrust Division calculated that in 14 overlapping courses, the minimum post-merger HHI would be 3,000 with a delta of 500. The Antitrust Division concluded that high barriers to entry exist because instructors infrequently switched textbooks and therefore it would be unlikely that a publisher would invest in the authors and editorial staff necessary to write a new textbook. The Antitrust Division’s Press Release and Competitive Impact Statement are attached. DOJ Press Release (Cengage/Houghton Mifflin); Competitive Impact Statement (Cengage/Houghton Mifflin).

Jun

09

Posted by : Matthew Wild | On : June 9, 2008

On June 6, 2008, Inova Health System announced that it is has abandoned its merger plans with Prince William Health Systems. The FTC had commenced an action in the United States District for the Eastern District of Virginia on May 12, 2008, in which it sought a preliminary injunction to block the merger during the pendency of its adminstrative proceeding. After the motion for a preliminary injunction had been submitted, the hospitals’ abandoned their merger plans. Abandoning merger plans after litigating through a preliminary injunction hearing is rare. The parties must have incurred millions of dollars in legal fees and a decision on the injunction was due in only a month. If the hospitals had prevailed in district court and merged, it is possible that the FTC would have dropped its administrative challenge. The administrative proceedings in this case also were unusual because the FTC appointed one of its Commissioners (Thomas Rosch) to act as the administrative judge.

Jun

06

Posted by : Matthew Wild | On : June 6, 2008

On June 5, 2008, the Antitrust Division issued a press release advising that it was closing its investigation into the potential anticompetitve effects from a joint venture between SABMiller plc (Miller) and Molson Coors Brewing Company to combine their operations in the United States. Although it did not provide any quantitative data, the Antitrust Division stated that based on information it received during its eight-month investigation from a wide-range of industry participants, it concluded that no adverse effect on competition would arise from the combination. Indeed, the Antitrust Division credited the parties’ efficiencies claims — noting that they were “verifiable and specifically related to the transaction and include large reductions in variable costs that are likely to have a beneficial effect on prices.” Thus, they met criteria set forth in the Merger Guidelines. Clearance of a merger based in large part on efficiencies is unusual. As a general matter, efficiencies are used by the parties to explain that there is no anticompetitive motive for the merger. Here, the parties were able to obtain much more credit for their efficiencies. Where beer drinkers are concerned, however, Antitrust Division did not note whether there would be a decrease in quality. Indeed, it is possible that the beer companies might rationalize brands to obtain efficiencies. Do loyalists to, for example, Molson Dry, have anything to fear? The Antitrust Division’s press release is attached. DOJ Press Release (Miller/Coors)

Jun

04

Posted by : Matthew Wild | On : June 4, 2008

On June 4, 2008, Electronic Arts (video game maker) gave the FTC an extension of time under the HSR Act to review the potential competitive effects of its $2 billion proposed acquisition of Take-Two (maker of Grand Theft Auto).  Under the agreement, EA must give the FTC 45 days’ notice of its intention to close.  Parties often grant the Antitrust Division and FTC more time to review their transactions with the hope of convincing the agencies not to challenge the merger or to allow them to negotiate a remedy.

May

30

Posted by : Matthew Wild | On : May 30, 2008

On May 27, 2008, the Ninth Circuit in Gerlinger v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 05-178328, 2008 WL 2169401 (9th Cir. May 27, 2008), affirmed dismissal of a customer’s challenge to the arrangement between Amazon and Borders whereby Amazon took over operation of Borders’ internet bookstore. Amazon submitted affidavits showing that the prices paid by plaintiff were the same or lower since the arrangement with Borders. The Ninth Circuit held that Plaintiff did not suffer any injury and therefore lacked Article 3 standing to pursue his antitrust claim. This case marks the second time in about one month that an appellate court has addressed the Article 3 standing of an antitrust plaintiff. The May 16, 2008 post discusses Ross v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 06-4755, 2008 WL 1836640 (2d Cir. Apr. 25, 2008), where the Second Circuit found that the antitrust plaintiffs had Article 3 standing. Although the Ross plaintiffs had not instituted arbitration proceedings or otherwise had a dispute with their credit card issuers, plaintiffs nevertheless had challenged the arbitration provisions in credit card agreements claiming that these provisions were inserted in the agreements as a result of a conspiracy among certain credit card issuers. According to the Second Circuit, the existence of the offending provisions alone were sufficient to confer standing.

May

12

Posted by : Matthew Wild | On : May 12, 2008

On May 5, 2008, the FTC conditioned its approval of Agrium’s $2.65 billion proposed acquisition of UAP Holding on divestitures on divestitures. The parties provide one-shopping for farms and farmers rely on these type of local stores for bulk fertilizer. Because of its weight, it does not make economic sense to ship these products more than 30 miles. Entry is difficult because of high sunk costs and the need to train personnel. Based on these dynamics, FTC believed that the parties’ overlapping stores in Croswell, Richmond, Imlay City, Vestaburg and Standish, Michigan and Girdletree, Maryland might give the combined company the ability to raise prices in those areas. Accordingly, the FTC required divestitures of one of the parties’ stores in these areas. The press release and analysis to aid public comment are attached.Agrium (Press Release);

Agrium (Analysis to Aid Public Comment)

May

06

Posted by : Matthew Wild | On : May 6, 2008

On April 30, 2008, the FTC obtained a consent decree against Talx Corporation for violating Section 7 of the Clayton Act. With $270 million in revenue last year, Talx Corporation is the leading provider of outsourced unemployment compensation management (“UCM”) and outsourced verification of income and employment services (“VOIE”). In 2002, Talx was the leader in the VOIE market and began a series of acquisitions in the VOIE and UCM markets that gave Talx market power. The Complaint alleged relevant markets of VOIE and UCM services and simply alleged that the markets were “highly concentrated and the consummated acquisitions increased concentration substantially.” The Complaint also challeged Talx’ alliance agreements in which ADP, Convergys and Ceridian outsource their VOIE and UCM to Talx. Although the preferred remedy is divestiture, the Consent Decree governed only Talx’ future conduct. Among other things, Talx must waive enforcement of certain non-compete and non-solicitation agreements, allow customers to rescind certain types of agreements, not allocate or divide markets for UCM services or discourage suppliers to refrain from doing business with competitors in the UCM market and allow ADP to outsource UCM services to competitors. It appears that Talx avoided substantial exposure for consummating transactions that ultimately prove to harm competition. As examined at length “Buyer Beware: Consummating Non-HSR Reportable Transactions May Prove Costly In the End,” Antitrust Litigator (Winter 2007) (see link to article under articles tab), Talx could have been required to divest the assets at distressed prices and possibly been faced with exposure for civil damages. The press release and analysis to aid public comment are attached. Talx (Press Release)Talx (Analysis to Aid Public Comment)


May

05

Posted by : Matthew Wild | On : May 5, 2008

On April 30, 2008, the Antitrust Division conditioned its approval of an acquisition by Regal Cinemas, Inc. of Consolidated Theater Holdings GP on divestitures in Southern Charlotte, Northern and Southern Raleigh and Asheville. On January 14, 2008, Regal — with $2.6 billion in revenue last year — agreed to acquire Consolidated — with $144 million in revenue last year — for $210 million. The Antitrust Division alleged a product market of the exhibition of first-run commercial movies. With respect to the geographic markets, the Antitrust Division alleged that moviegoers in Southern Charlotte, Northern and Southern Raleigh and Asheville would be unlikely to travel a significant difference in response to a small but significant non-transitory increase in price. The relevant markets were highly concentrated with HHIs ranging from 6058 to 6523 and deltas exceeding 2,000 except for Southern Raleigh where the transaction would be a merger to monopoly. The Antitrust Division also alleged high entry barriers because the demographics of these geographic markets would not support the sunk costs associated with opening a new theater. Attached are the DOJ Press Release and Competitive Impact Statement. Regal (DOJ Press Release); Regal (Competitive Impact Statement)