Oct

24

Posted by : Matthew Wild | On : October 24, 2008

On October 20, 2008, the Antitrust Division, Colorado, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas and Wyoming sued to enjoin JBS Beef’s acquisition of National Beef Packing in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.  (Beef Complaint; Beef Press Release)  The government alleges that the merger would combine the third and fourth largest U.S. beef packers, which would result in lower prices for cattle and higher prices for beef consumers.  This action is interesting in two respects.  First, one of the theories of competitive harm is that the beef packers will gain monopsony power.  While the monopsony theory is well established and has been pursued in Antitrust Division challenges to mergers (e.g., Cargill’s acquisition of Continental Grain’s Commodity Marketing Group), some academics reject it because it is inconsistent with the monopsonist’s economic interest to drive prices so low that suppliers exit.  Second, although venue and personal jurisdiction were available in any district where the companies did business, the government chose the Chicago as its forum.  It likely did so because it has received favorable treatment there in the past and Seventh Circuit cases are favorable to merger challenges.  For example, the government prevailed in United States v. UPM Kymmene Oyj (a case in which this author was trial counsel) even though the government’s case was at best shaky and viewed by many as without merit.

Oct

20

Posted by : Matthew Wild | On : October 20, 2008

In In re Apple & AT&TM Antitrust Litigation, No. 07-CV-05152-JW (N.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2008) (attached IPhone Decision), plaintiffs alleged that the arrangement in which the Apple IPhone worked exclusively with AT&TM not only for the initial two-year contract period but also for three additional years after their contracts expired with AT&TM violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act.  Plaintiffs also alleged that Apple’s restrictions on dowloadable applications for use on IPhones violated Section 2.  Plaintiffs alleged Section 2 claims of monopolization and attempted monopolization of the market for IPhone applications and monopolization, attempted monopolization and a conspiracy to monopolize the market for voice and data services to IPhone owners.  The Northern District of California held that there were cognizable relevant product markets limited to Apple IPhone customers in these aftermarkets.  The court distinguished cases in which customers voluntarily commit to a lock-in through a contract such as when a franchisee agrees to purchase certain products from its franchisor.  In this case, the Complaint alleged that the lock-in was created through deceit or unbeknownst to the customers at the time of purchase.  The Complaint alleged that the IPhone customers did not know that they could not unlock their IPhones from AT&TM service after the two-year commitment or  the limitation on downloadable applications.  This case is consistent with the Supreme Court’s approach in determining whether aftermarkets represent separate relevant product markets.  The key inquiry is whether the consumer knows or has reason to know of limitations in purchasing products or services in the afermarket before he becomes locked-in by the initial purchase.

Oct

06

Posted by : Matthew Wild | On : October 6, 2008

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently held that Major League Baseball’s licensing of team logos was subject to rule of reason review under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.  The court affirmed summary judgment in favor of MLB because the appellant did not challenge the licensing program under that rule.  Major League Baseball Properties, Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., No. 06-1867 (2d Cir. Sept. 12, 2008) (attached MLB Properties v. Salvino).  The baseball clubs give (with a few exceptions) exclusive licensing rights to a single entity.  According to the MLB’s expert Frank Fisher (a world renowned economist), this system offers many efficiencies including allowing MLB licensing to compete better with other sports licensing; offering one-stop shopping to licensees; centralized management on matters such as quality control, intellectual property rights enforcement and negotiations and sales to licensees.  According to Fisher, these efficiencies should result in lower licensing fees.  The appellant had offered an expert report from economist Mr. Louis A. Guth, a Special Consultant for NERA, who disputed these efficiencies and asserted that the MLB licensing entity functioned as a cartel unresponsive to demand.  The Second Circuit affirmed the exclusion of Guth’s report under Daubert v. Merrell Dow because (unlike Fischer’s report) it was unsupported by evidentiary citations or empirical analysis.  The Second Circuit held that the rule of reason and not the per se rule or “quick look” analysis applied because the “arrangement might plausibly be thought to have a net precompetitive effect, or possibly no effect at all on competition.”  Through different reasoning, the Second Circuit in this case reached the same result as the Seventh Circuit did in a challenge to a nearly identical licensing program by the NFL.  See American Needle Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, No. 07-4006, 2008 WL 3822782 (7th Cir. Aug. 18, 2008) discussed in the Post of September 4, 2008.  In that case, the Seventh Circuit held that the NFL teams were incapable of conspiring with themselves under the Copperweld doctrine in these particular circumstances.  In this case, the Second Circuit did not address the Copperweld doctrine, but it did observe that the relevant market should include licenses for other professional sports.  Therefore, it would be unlikely for the MLB’s licensing activities to have an effect on competition.  This case should prove useful for practitioners for its discussion of when the per se rule, rule of reason or quick look analysis applies, the tests used under these analyses and the pitfalls of an inadequate expert report.

Sep

18

Posted by : Matthew Wild | On : September 18, 2008

The Ninth Circuit affirmed dismissal of foreigner purchasers’ Section 1 claims against DRAM manufacturers for price-fixing.  In re Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) Antitrust Litig., No. 06-15636, 2008 WL 3522419 (9th Cir. Aug. 14, 2008).  The plaintiffs alleged that they purchased DRAM abroad at supra-competitive prices due to defendants’ price fixing activities.  The only link between the effect on U.S. commerce and plaintiffs’ injuries was that in order for the cartel to be successful, defendants had to fix prices in the U.S. and abroad.  Constitent with the many courts that have visited this issue since the Supreme Court’s decision in F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004), the Ninth Circuit held that such allegations were insufficient to bring plaintiffs’ claims within the “domestic injury” exception to the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act.  That statute excludes “conduct that causes only foreign injury” from the reach of the U.S. antitrust laws.  Id. at 158.  Judge Noonan’s concurring opinion is particularly interesting as he has explains that the decision is nothing more than a policy choice by “Congress and the Supreme Court that the economic interests of consumers outside the United States are normally not something American law is intended to protect.”  As Judge Noonan observes, “[w]e reach this vanishing point not from guidance in words like ‘proximate’ or ‘direct’ but from a strong sense that the protection of consumers in another country is normally the business of that country.  Location, not logic, keeps [plaintiff’s] claim out of court.”

Sep

11

Posted by : Matthew Wild | On : September 11, 2008

The attorneys general of Virginia, Alabama, Colorado, Florida, Kansas, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Utah and Washington filed an amicus curiae brief in favor of petitioner in Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. Linkline, No. 07-512, which is pending before the Supreme Court.  This case raises the issue of whether a price squeeze claim can be maintained against a firm that does not have a duty to deal with the plaintiff.  As discussed in the Post of June 24, 2008, this case created a conflict between the Antitrust Division and FTC.  The Antitrust Division filed an amicus curiae brief supporting certiorai and urging reversal while the FTC issued a statement asserting that this case was not appropriate for certiorari and in any event, was correctly decided.  The brief (attached States Amicus Curiae Brief) filed by these nine state attorneys general supports the Antitrust Division’s position.

Sep

04

Posted by : Matthew Wild | On : September 4, 2008

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit applied the Copperweld doctrine to a sports league for the first time. In so doing, it recently affirmed summary judgment in favor of the NFL, its teams and Reebok in an antitrust challenge to an exclusive license of team names and logos to Reebok for use on headwear. American Needle Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, No. 07-4006, 2008 WL 3822782 (7th Cir. Aug. 18, 2008) (attached  American Needle v. NFL). The plaintiff — an unsuccessful bidder — alleged that the collective action by the teams to combine all of their intellectual property rights and create an exclusive license was a conspiracy to prevent other vendors from obtaining licenses to the team names and logos in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The plaintiff also alleged that the teams monopolized “the NFL team licensing and product wholesale markets” in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Id. at *2. The Seventh Circuit held that the teams should be treated as a single entity under the Copperweld doctrine. As explained in Wild, et al., “Private Equity Groups Under Common Legal Control Constitute a Single Enterprise Under the Antitrust Laws,” 3 NYU Journal of Law and Business 231, 237 and n.31 (attached under articles above), that doctrine treats two or more firms that are under common ownership or have a unity of interest in a common course of action as a single firm incapable of conspiring or otherwise acting collectively under the antitrust laws. The Seventh Circuit did so because “the teams share a vital economic interest in collectively promoting all of NFL football” (id. at *7) and should be able to cooperate so that the NFL “can compete against other entertainment providers.” Id. at *8.

Aug

20

Posted by : Matthew Wild | On : August 20, 2008

The Wall Street Journal reported today that the FTC has informed Electronic Arts and Take-Two Interactive Software that is has no objection to the combination of the companies. As you may recall, on June 4, 2008 the parties agreed to give the FTC an additional 45-days to review the transaction under the HSR Act. The clearance might be too late. EA’s tender offer expired on August 18, 2008. The Wall Street Journal reports, however, that EA is still is exploring ways to acquire Take-Two.

Aug

12

Posted by : Matthew Wild | On : August 12, 2008

On August 8, 2008, the FTC approved its preliminary consent order (with minor, immaterial modifications) from April 28, 2008 against Talx Corporation that remedied Talx’ anticompetitive acquisitions of competitor.  See April 30, 2008 Post.   As explained it that Post, this FTC action was of interest to practitioners because of the nature of Talx’ conduct and the use of a conduct remedy rather than divestitures to remedy acquisitions that violated the Section 7 of the Clayton Act.

Aug

11

Posted by : Matthew Wild | On : August 11, 2008

The United States Court for the District of Columbia affirmed summary judgment dismissing a class action brought by wholesalers of brand name drugs, which alleged that Biovail misused its patent for Tiazac – a hypertension drug – to keep a generic version from the market. Meijer, Inc. v. Biovail Corp., Nos. 05-7066, 05-7069, 06-7118, 2008 WL 2853281 (D.C. Cir. July 25, 2008) (attached Meijer v. Biovail). Plaintiffs claimed that Biovail falsely asserted to the FDA its newly acquired patent protected Tiazac from generic competition. After Andrx – the first-to-file generic manufacturer — advised the FDA that it disagreed with Biovail’s claim, Biovail brought an action for patent infringement action. Under the Hatch-Waxman Act scheme, commencement of the patent infringement action barred Andrx from bringing a generic to market for either 30 months from the date that Andrx certified to the FDA that its generic did not infringe Biovail’s patent or when it prevailed in the litigation. While the litigation was pending, Andrx encountered difficulty sourcing its generic. The D.C. Circuit affirmed summary judgment holding that plaintiffs lacked antitrust injury because they failed to demonstrate but-for Biovail’s conduct, Andrx would have been able to enter the market with its generic. Id. at *6.

Aug

05

Posted by : Matthew Wild | On : August 5, 2008

The First Circuit recently denied antitrust immunity to a labor union and certain contractors in an action by non-union shops alleging that the defendants forced them from the market in violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. American Steel Erectors, Inc. v. Local Union No. 7, No. 07-1832, 2008 WL 2941576 (1st Cir. Aug. 1, 2008) (attached American Steel Erectors v. Local 7). In particular, “Plaintiffs allege a conspiracy between the Union and union employers to monopolize the structural steel industry in the Boston area and push non-union employers like Plaintiffs out of the market. To this end, Plaintiffs claim that Local 7 used Fund subsidies and other tactics to ensure that contracts were awarded to signatory contractors, rather than Plaintiffs. Specifically, Plaintiffs assert that Local 7 used Fund subsidies to assist signatory employers in underbidding Plaintiffs on erection jobs. Plaintiffs also claim that Local 7 used subsidies, threats, and picketing to pressure fabricators, developers, owners, and general contractors (none of which directly employ Local 7 workers) into breaching contracts with Plaintiffs and replacing them with signatory contractors.” The district court granted Defendants summary judgment holding that this activity was immune from the antitrust laws under the statutory labor exemption. The First Circuit reversed. For that exemption to apply, “the union [must] act[] in its self-interest and … not combine with non-labor groups.” Id. (quoting United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 231 (1941). The First Circuit held that the activity did not satisfy the second prong for numerous reasons. At base, the court noted that the because the subsidies are collected through, and paid to, employers through collective bargaining agreements, they by definition involve a combination with non-labor groups. Although not addressed by the district court, the First Circuit also determined that the non-statutory labor exemption — which “shields some restraints on competition imposed through the bargaining process, where the alleged anticompetitive conduct is anchored in the collective-bargaining process, concerns only the parties to the collective bargaining relationship, and relates to wages, hours, conditions of employment, or other mandatory subjects of collective bargaining” — did not apply. The First Circuit held that “there are sufficient genuinely disputed issues of material fact here to render summary judgment inappropriate. Plaintiffs have alleged concerted union-employer action that extended beyond merely the wage deduction provided for in the CBA and the job-by-job subsidy agreements, to collaboration in the identification and acquisition of target projects.”