May

12

Posted by : Matthew Wild | On : May 12, 2008

On May 5, 2008, the FTC conditioned its approval of Agrium’s $2.65 billion proposed acquisition of UAP Holding on divestitures on divestitures. The parties provide one-shopping for farms and farmers rely on these type of local stores for bulk fertilizer. Because of its weight, it does not make economic sense to ship these products more than 30 miles. Entry is difficult because of high sunk costs and the need to train personnel. Based on these dynamics, FTC believed that the parties’ overlapping stores in Croswell, Richmond, Imlay City, Vestaburg and Standish, Michigan and Girdletree, Maryland might give the combined company the ability to raise prices in those areas. Accordingly, the FTC required divestitures of one of the parties’ stores in these areas. The press release and analysis to aid public comment are attached.Agrium (Press Release);

Agrium (Analysis to Aid Public Comment)

May

06

Posted by : Matthew Wild | On : May 6, 2008

On April 30, 2008, the FTC obtained a consent decree against Talx Corporation for violating Section 7 of the Clayton Act. With $270 million in revenue last year, Talx Corporation is the leading provider of outsourced unemployment compensation management (“UCM”) and outsourced verification of income and employment services (“VOIE”). In 2002, Talx was the leader in the VOIE market and began a series of acquisitions in the VOIE and UCM markets that gave Talx market power. The Complaint alleged relevant markets of VOIE and UCM services and simply alleged that the markets were “highly concentrated and the consummated acquisitions increased concentration substantially.” The Complaint also challeged Talx’ alliance agreements in which ADP, Convergys and Ceridian outsource their VOIE and UCM to Talx. Although the preferred remedy is divestiture, the Consent Decree governed only Talx’ future conduct. Among other things, Talx must waive enforcement of certain non-compete and non-solicitation agreements, allow customers to rescind certain types of agreements, not allocate or divide markets for UCM services or discourage suppliers to refrain from doing business with competitors in the UCM market and allow ADP to outsource UCM services to competitors. It appears that Talx avoided substantial exposure for consummating transactions that ultimately prove to harm competition. As examined at length “Buyer Beware: Consummating Non-HSR Reportable Transactions May Prove Costly In the End,” Antitrust Litigator (Winter 2007) (see link to article under articles tab), Talx could have been required to divest the assets at distressed prices and possibly been faced with exposure for civil damages. The press release and analysis to aid public comment are attached. Talx (Press Release)Talx (Analysis to Aid Public Comment)