Aug

20

Posted by : Matthew Wild | On : August 20, 2008

The Wall Street Journal reported today that the FTC has informed Electronic Arts and Take-Two Interactive Software that is has no objection to the combination of the companies. As you may recall, on June 4, 2008 the parties agreed to give the FTC an additional 45-days to review the transaction under the HSR Act. The clearance might be too late. EA’s tender offer expired on August 18, 2008. The Wall Street Journal reports, however, that EA is still is exploring ways to acquire Take-Two.

Aug

12

Posted by : Matthew Wild | On : August 12, 2008

On August 8, 2008, the FTC approved its preliminary consent order (with minor, immaterial modifications) from April 28, 2008 against Talx Corporation that remedied Talx’ anticompetitive acquisitions of competitor.  See April 30, 2008 Post.   As explained it that Post, this FTC action was of interest to practitioners because of the nature of Talx’ conduct and the use of a conduct remedy rather than divestitures to remedy acquisitions that violated the Section 7 of the Clayton Act.

Aug

11

Posted by : Matthew Wild | On : August 11, 2008

The United States Court for the District of Columbia affirmed summary judgment dismissing a class action brought by wholesalers of brand name drugs, which alleged that Biovail misused its patent for Tiazac – a hypertension drug – to keep a generic version from the market. Meijer, Inc. v. Biovail Corp., Nos. 05-7066, 05-7069, 06-7118, 2008 WL 2853281 (D.C. Cir. July 25, 2008) (attached Meijer v. Biovail). Plaintiffs claimed that Biovail falsely asserted to the FDA its newly acquired patent protected Tiazac from generic competition. After Andrx – the first-to-file generic manufacturer — advised the FDA that it disagreed with Biovail’s claim, Biovail brought an action for patent infringement action. Under the Hatch-Waxman Act scheme, commencement of the patent infringement action barred Andrx from bringing a generic to market for either 30 months from the date that Andrx certified to the FDA that its generic did not infringe Biovail’s patent or when it prevailed in the litigation. While the litigation was pending, Andrx encountered difficulty sourcing its generic. The D.C. Circuit affirmed summary judgment holding that plaintiffs lacked antitrust injury because they failed to demonstrate but-for Biovail’s conduct, Andrx would have been able to enter the market with its generic. Id. at *6.

Aug

05

Posted by : Matthew Wild | On : August 5, 2008

The First Circuit recently denied antitrust immunity to a labor union and certain contractors in an action by non-union shops alleging that the defendants forced them from the market in violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. American Steel Erectors, Inc. v. Local Union No. 7, No. 07-1832, 2008 WL 2941576 (1st Cir. Aug. 1, 2008) (attached American Steel Erectors v. Local 7). In particular, “Plaintiffs allege a conspiracy between the Union and union employers to monopolize the structural steel industry in the Boston area and push non-union employers like Plaintiffs out of the market. To this end, Plaintiffs claim that Local 7 used Fund subsidies and other tactics to ensure that contracts were awarded to signatory contractors, rather than Plaintiffs. Specifically, Plaintiffs assert that Local 7 used Fund subsidies to assist signatory employers in underbidding Plaintiffs on erection jobs. Plaintiffs also claim that Local 7 used subsidies, threats, and picketing to pressure fabricators, developers, owners, and general contractors (none of which directly employ Local 7 workers) into breaching contracts with Plaintiffs and replacing them with signatory contractors.” The district court granted Defendants summary judgment holding that this activity was immune from the antitrust laws under the statutory labor exemption. The First Circuit reversed. For that exemption to apply, “the union [must] act[] in its self-interest and … not combine with non-labor groups.” Id. (quoting United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 231 (1941). The First Circuit held that the activity did not satisfy the second prong for numerous reasons. At base, the court noted that the because the subsidies are collected through, and paid to, employers through collective bargaining agreements, they by definition involve a combination with non-labor groups. Although not addressed by the district court, the First Circuit also determined that the non-statutory labor exemption — which “shields some restraints on competition imposed through the bargaining process, where the alleged anticompetitive conduct is anchored in the collective-bargaining process, concerns only the parties to the collective bargaining relationship, and relates to wages, hours, conditions of employment, or other mandatory subjects of collective bargaining” — did not apply. The First Circuit held that “there are sufficient genuinely disputed issues of material fact here to render summary judgment inappropriate. Plaintiffs have alleged concerted union-employer action that extended beyond merely the wage deduction provided for in the CBA and the job-by-job subsidy agreements, to collaboration in the identification and acquisition of target projects.”

Jul

29

Posted by : Matthew Wild | On : July 29, 2008

Today, the D.C. Circuit reversed the district court’s decision that denied a preliminary injunction in the Whole Foods/Wild Oats merger. FTC v. Whole Foods Markets, Inc., No. 07-5276 (D.C. Cir. July 29, 2008) (Whole Foods decision). Crucial to the decision was the D.C. Circuit’s holding that the FTC might have been able to establish a submarket consisting of premium natural and organic supermarkets.

The case was remanded to the district court and one of the questions was whether there was some remedy available during the pendency of the FTC administrative proceedings. The D.C. Circuit noted that the FTC complained of adverse effects on competition in only eighteen different local markets. The D.C. Circuit also noted that neither party discussed whether sufficient distribution facilities were available for Wild Oats to remain a viable competitor and if only one Wild Oats store can re-open that would be better than nothing. The D.C. Circuit suggested a hold separate order, which seems to imply that the assets would be carved out and transferred from Whole Foods to a trustee. This begs the question, however, of who would (and could) manage the store(s) independent of Whole Foods.

Ultimately, it seems like Whole Foods can expect to lose the administrative proceedings. If it does, Whole Foods may have to divest stores in these markets. The Supreme Court long ago held that divestiture is the preferred remedy. Neither the courts nor the agencies favor rescission.

Jul

29

Posted by : Matthew Wild | On : July 29, 2008

On July 25, 2008, the D.C. Circuit reversed summary judgment in favor of the government that denied appellant’s Freedom of Information Act request. Stolt-Nielsen Transportation Group Ltd. v. United States, Nos. 07-5191, 07-5192 2008 WL 2853214 (D.C. Cir. July 25, 2008) (attached Stolt v. U.S.). The appellant (Stolt-Nielsen) had sought the Antitrust Division’s amnesty agreements with other recipients that were based on the model that the Antitrust Division used in the early days of the program. Stolt limited its request to allow for redaction of the names of companies and individuals from the request. The amnesty program allows the first company or individual that self-reports an antitrust violation to receive immunity from prosecution except in extraordinary circumstances. Congress also has enacted legislation that reduces an amnesty recipient’s exposure from treble to single damages in private antitrust litigation. Thus, amnesty can be invaluable to a company that learns of criminal antitrust misconduct of its officers. The D.C. Circuit reversed the district court that held that the information sought by Stolt was not reasonably segregable because the district court did not make any findings to support its decision. The D.C. Circuit remanded the case for the district court to make findings consistent with its opinion. As you may recall, Stolt had been in litigation over enforcement of its amnesty agreement ultimately prevailing at trial. The Antitrust Division revoked the agreement claiming that Stolt breached it by continuing to violate the antitrust laws after entering into the agreement. The Eastern District of Pennsylvania disagreed and dismissed the indictment. (See Mach 15, 2008 Post, “DOJ’s Antitrust Division (Criminal Section) Suffers Four Major Losses Within the Last Year.”

Jul

25

Posted by : Matthew Wild | On : July 25, 2008

It appears that the antitrust agencies are more vigilant to protect the interests of vodka drinkers than beer drinkers. As explained in the June 6, 2008 Post, the Antitrust Division was not concerned that there would be negative effects on competition if Coors and Molson formed a joint venture. However, the FTC has taken the opposite view in a merger among spirit makers because it effectively would put Absolut and Stolichnaya under the control of one company. The buyer Pernot Ricard will gain control V&S Vin Spirit’s Absolut and has a distribution agreement that covers Stolichnaya, In analyzing the transaction, the FTC defined the market as super premium brands of vodka and claimed that consumers viewed Absolut and Stolichnaya as their top two choices. Without discussing market shares, the Analysis to Aid Public Comment asserts that post-merger the buyer will be able to increase the prices of super premium vodka. Under the consent agreement, Pernot Ricard must end its distribution agreement for Stolichnaya within 6 months. The press release and Analysis to Aid Public Comment are attached. FTC Press Release (Vodka); Analysis to Aid Public Comment (Vodka).

Jul

18

Posted by : Matthew Wild | On : July 18, 2008

The Tenth Circuit affirmed summary judgment dismissing a Complaint brought by an owner of a  windshield repair shop alleging State Farm’s policy that advises its insureds to replace (rather than repair) windshields with cracks longer than six inches violates Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and the Colorado Consumer Protection Act. Campfield v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., Nos. 06-1442, 06-1467, 06-1469, 2008 WL 2736656 (10th Cir. July 15, 2008). The Court rejected plaintiff’s Section 1 and 2 claims because he could not establish a relevant product market — a necessary element of both claims. The Court noted that plaintiff alleged State Farm’s misuse of its monopsony power over its insured and therefore the relevant market “is not the market of competing sellers but of competing buyers. This market is comprised of buyers who are seen by sellers as being reasonably good substitutes.” Id. at *4 (citation omitted). Plaintiff alleged a “State Farm insured repairable windshield market, in the geographic area of the United States of America.” Id. The Tenth Circuit rejected this market definition as underinclusive because plaintiff offered no basis why sellers would not view other buyers of repairable windshields as reasonable substitutes. The Tenth Circuit made clear that the rule of reason applied to the Section 1 claim notwithstanding plaintiff’s characterization of State Farm’s conduct as a group boycott. The restraint was vertical in nature and not the classic horizontal group boycott that triggers per se condemnation. The Tenth Circuit rejected the Consumer Protection Act claim because the recommendations to insureds to replace rather than repair windshields were not knowing and intentional concealment or misrepresentations as required under the Act. This opinion is useful for its discussion of limitations on pleading relevant markets as well as the relevant market inquiry in monopsony cases.

Jul

17

Posted by : Matthew Wild | On : July 17, 2008

On July 3, 2008, the Antitrust Division conditioned its approval of Signature Flight Support’s acquisition of Hawker Beechcraft’s competing flight support business on divestitures at the Indianapolis International Airport. Signature and Hawker both provide flight support services (also called fixed base operations) to charter and corporate airplanes at 45 and 7 airports respectively across the United States. At the Indianapolis airport, Signature and Hawker are the only two providers of these services. Accordingly, the Antitrust Division required divestiture of one of the two parties’ assets at the Indianapolis airport to a buyer that it approves.

Jul

15

Posted by : Matthew Wild | On : July 15, 2008

On July 11, 2008, the Ninth Circuit affirmed dismissal of a franchisee’s tying claim regarding credit and debit card processing services that was nearly identical to a claim that Judge Posner rejected on June 23, 2008 in Sheridan v. Marathon Petroleum LLC. (See July 11, 2008 Post). In Rick-Mik Enterprises Inc. v. Equilon Enterprises, LLC, No. 06-55937, 2008 WL 2697793 (9th Cir. July 11, 2008), a franchisee claimed that the requirement that it use the franchisor’s credit and debit card processing services was tying in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The Ninth Circuit rejected this claim for the same reasons that the Seventh Circuit did in Sheridan. The Ninth Circuit affirmed dismissal because that the complaint lacked (1) allegations that Equilon had market power in the gasoline franchise market and (2) credit and debit card processing services was not a distinct product from the rest of the Equilon gasoline station franchise.