Aug

12

Posted by : Matthew Wild | On : August 12, 2008

On August 8, 2008, the FTC approved its preliminary consent order (with minor, immaterial modifications) from April 28, 2008 against Talx Corporation that remedied Talx’ anticompetitive acquisitions of competitor.  See April 30, 2008 Post.   As explained it that Post, this FTC action was of interest to practitioners because of the nature of Talx’ conduct and the use of a conduct remedy rather than divestitures to remedy acquisitions that violated the Section 7 of the Clayton Act.

Jul

29

Posted by : Matthew Wild | On : July 29, 2008

Today, the D.C. Circuit reversed the district court’s decision that denied a preliminary injunction in the Whole Foods/Wild Oats merger. FTC v. Whole Foods Markets, Inc., No. 07-5276 (D.C. Cir. July 29, 2008) (Whole Foods decision). Crucial to the decision was the D.C. Circuit’s holding that the FTC might have been able to establish a submarket consisting of premium natural and organic supermarkets.

The case was remanded to the district court and one of the questions was whether there was some remedy available during the pendency of the FTC administrative proceedings. The D.C. Circuit noted that the FTC complained of adverse effects on competition in only eighteen different local markets. The D.C. Circuit also noted that neither party discussed whether sufficient distribution facilities were available for Wild Oats to remain a viable competitor and if only one Wild Oats store can re-open that would be better than nothing. The D.C. Circuit suggested a hold separate order, which seems to imply that the assets would be carved out and transferred from Whole Foods to a trustee. This begs the question, however, of who would (and could) manage the store(s) independent of Whole Foods.

Ultimately, it seems like Whole Foods can expect to lose the administrative proceedings. If it does, Whole Foods may have to divest stores in these markets. The Supreme Court long ago held that divestiture is the preferred remedy. Neither the courts nor the agencies favor rescission.

Jul

25

Posted by : Matthew Wild | On : July 25, 2008

It appears that the antitrust agencies are more vigilant to protect the interests of vodka drinkers than beer drinkers. As explained in the June 6, 2008 Post, the Antitrust Division was not concerned that there would be negative effects on competition if Coors and Molson formed a joint venture. However, the FTC has taken the opposite view in a merger among spirit makers because it effectively would put Absolut and Stolichnaya under the control of one company. The buyer Pernot Ricard will gain control V&S Vin Spirit’s Absolut and has a distribution agreement that covers Stolichnaya, In analyzing the transaction, the FTC defined the market as super premium brands of vodka and claimed that consumers viewed Absolut and Stolichnaya as their top two choices. Without discussing market shares, the Analysis to Aid Public Comment asserts that post-merger the buyer will be able to increase the prices of super premium vodka. Under the consent agreement, Pernot Ricard must end its distribution agreement for Stolichnaya within 6 months. The press release and Analysis to Aid Public Comment are attached. FTC Press Release (Vodka); Analysis to Aid Public Comment (Vodka).

Jul

17

Posted by : Matthew Wild | On : July 17, 2008

On July 3, 2008, the Antitrust Division conditioned its approval of Signature Flight Support’s acquisition of Hawker Beechcraft’s competing flight support business on divestitures at the Indianapolis International Airport. Signature and Hawker both provide flight support services (also called fixed base operations) to charter and corporate airplanes at 45 and 7 airports respectively across the United States. At the Indianapolis airport, Signature and Hawker are the only two providers of these services. Accordingly, the Antitrust Division required divestiture of one of the two parties’ assets at the Indianapolis airport to a buyer that it approves.

Jul

08

Posted by : Matthew Wild | On : July 8, 2008

On June 30, 2008, the First Circuit held that leasees of motor vehicles could not recover under Section 4 of the Clayton Act because they were indirect purchasers of the vehicles. In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Export Antitrust Litig., No. 07-1990, 2008 WL 2568457 (1st Cir. June 30, 2008). In Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977), the Supreme Court held that only plaintiffs that purchased a product directly from a co-conspirator can recover treble damages under Section 4 of the Clayton Act for a violation of the antitrust laws. In an action brought by leasees of motor vehicles who claimed that the motor vehicle manufacturers had conspired to prevent the sale of motor vehicles in Canada to U.S. consumers for export into the U.S., the First Circuit held that the dealers and not the leasing companies or leasees were the direct purchasers under Illinois Brick. The Court held that because the dealers negotiate the terms of the sale in response to rates set by the leasing companies, the dealers were the direct victims of an antitrust violation by the manufacturers. An interesting question is whether consumers in this case have remedies under state antitrust laws if their claims are based on purchases in Canada. Followers of this litigation are directed to the April 14, 2008 Post discussing the First Circuit’s treatment of class certification.

Jun

09

Posted by : Matthew Wild | On : June 9, 2008

On June 6, 2008, Inova Health System announced that it is has abandoned its merger plans with Prince William Health Systems. The FTC had commenced an action in the United States District for the Eastern District of Virginia on May 12, 2008, in which it sought a preliminary injunction to block the merger during the pendency of its adminstrative proceeding. After the motion for a preliminary injunction had been submitted, the hospitals’ abandoned their merger plans. Abandoning merger plans after litigating through a preliminary injunction hearing is rare. The parties must have incurred millions of dollars in legal fees and a decision on the injunction was due in only a month. If the hospitals had prevailed in district court and merged, it is possible that the FTC would have dropped its administrative challenge. The administrative proceedings in this case also were unusual because the FTC appointed one of its Commissioners (Thomas Rosch) to act as the administrative judge.

May

12

Posted by : Matthew Wild | On : May 12, 2008

On May 5, 2008, the FTC conditioned its approval of Agrium’s $2.65 billion proposed acquisition of UAP Holding on divestitures on divestitures. The parties provide one-shopping for farms and farmers rely on these type of local stores for bulk fertilizer. Because of its weight, it does not make economic sense to ship these products more than 30 miles. Entry is difficult because of high sunk costs and the need to train personnel. Based on these dynamics, FTC believed that the parties’ overlapping stores in Croswell, Richmond, Imlay City, Vestaburg and Standish, Michigan and Girdletree, Maryland might give the combined company the ability to raise prices in those areas. Accordingly, the FTC required divestitures of one of the parties’ stores in these areas. The press release and analysis to aid public comment are attached.Agrium (Press Release);

Agrium (Analysis to Aid Public Comment)

May

06

Posted by : Matthew Wild | On : May 6, 2008

On April 30, 2008, the FTC obtained a consent decree against Talx Corporation for violating Section 7 of the Clayton Act. With $270 million in revenue last year, Talx Corporation is the leading provider of outsourced unemployment compensation management (“UCM”) and outsourced verification of income and employment services (“VOIE”). In 2002, Talx was the leader in the VOIE market and began a series of acquisitions in the VOIE and UCM markets that gave Talx market power. The Complaint alleged relevant markets of VOIE and UCM services and simply alleged that the markets were “highly concentrated and the consummated acquisitions increased concentration substantially.” The Complaint also challeged Talx’ alliance agreements in which ADP, Convergys and Ceridian outsource their VOIE and UCM to Talx. Although the preferred remedy is divestiture, the Consent Decree governed only Talx’ future conduct. Among other things, Talx must waive enforcement of certain non-compete and non-solicitation agreements, allow customers to rescind certain types of agreements, not allocate or divide markets for UCM services or discourage suppliers to refrain from doing business with competitors in the UCM market and allow ADP to outsource UCM services to competitors. It appears that Talx avoided substantial exposure for consummating transactions that ultimately prove to harm competition. As examined at length “Buyer Beware: Consummating Non-HSR Reportable Transactions May Prove Costly In the End,” Antitrust Litigator (Winter 2007) (see link to article under articles tab), Talx could have been required to divest the assets at distressed prices and possibly been faced with exposure for civil damages. The press release and analysis to aid public comment are attached. Talx (Press Release)Talx (Analysis to Aid Public Comment)


May

05

Posted by : Matthew Wild | On : May 5, 2008

On April 30, 2008, the Antitrust Division conditioned its approval of an acquisition by Regal Cinemas, Inc. of Consolidated Theater Holdings GP on divestitures in Southern Charlotte, Northern and Southern Raleigh and Asheville. On January 14, 2008, Regal — with $2.6 billion in revenue last year — agreed to acquire Consolidated — with $144 million in revenue last year — for $210 million. The Antitrust Division alleged a product market of the exhibition of first-run commercial movies. With respect to the geographic markets, the Antitrust Division alleged that moviegoers in Southern Charlotte, Northern and Southern Raleigh and Asheville would be unlikely to travel a significant difference in response to a small but significant non-transitory increase in price. The relevant markets were highly concentrated with HHIs ranging from 6058 to 6523 and deltas exceeding 2,000 except for Southern Raleigh where the transaction would be a merger to monopoly. The Antitrust Division also alleged high entry barriers because the demographics of these geographic markets would not support the sunk costs associated with opening a new theater. Attached are the DOJ Press Release and Competitive Impact Statement. Regal (DOJ Press Release); Regal (Competitive Impact Statement)