On May 6, 2008, the FTC granted Nine West’s petition to modify its consent decree to allow Nine West to engage in resale price maintenance with its dealers. In 2000, Nine West — a footwear manufacturer — had entered into a consent decree with the FTC and several state attorneys general to resolve allegations that it fixed the prices at which its retailers may sell its shoes. Because of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Leegin Creative Leather Products v. PSKS, 127 S.Ct. 2705 (2007), which allowed such agreements to be treated under the rule of reason rather than subject to per se condemnation, the FTC allowed Nine West to engage in resale price maintenance but did not rule that such conduct would be necessarily lawful. Rather, the consent decree requires to Nine West to provide periodic reports to the FTC of prices and output during periods when it has engaged in resale price maintenance. As a practical matter, modification of the consent decree may be bring little comfort as some state attorneys general have taken the position that resale price maintenance is still a per se violation of their antitrust statutes. Herman Miller (discussed in the March 31, 2008 post) is an example of such an application of the state antitrust antitrust laws. Attached is the FTC’s order in Nine West. Nine West (Order)
Apr
24
Posted by : | On : April 24, 2008
Yesterday, the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit granted Rambus’ petition for review. This decision was much awaited among antitrust counselors because it represented an attempt by the FTC to extend the antitrust laws to cover deceptive practices directed at standard-setting organizations. After administrative proceedings, the FTC held that Rambus violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act and Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act by concealing to a standard-setting organization that it held patents in a technology which it urged the organization to adopt. Rambus then allegedly used the organization’s adoption of its technology to overcharge for licenses. In rejecting the claim under Section 2, the court explained, “if JEDEC, in the world that would have existed but for Rambus’s deception, would have standardized the very same technologies, Rambus’s alleged deception cannot be said to have had an effect on competition in violation of the antitrust laws; JEDEC’s loss of an opportunity to seek favorable licensing terms is not as such an antitrust harm. Yet the Commission did not reject this as being a possible—perhaps even the more probable—effect of Rambus’s conduct. We hold, therefore, that the Commission failed to demonstrate that Rambus’s conduct was exclusionary, and thus to establish its claim that Rambus unlawfully monopolized the relevant markets.” Rambus Inc. v. FTC, No. 07-1086 at 19 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 22, 2008). With respect to Section 5 of the FTCA, the court also expressed “serious concerns about strength of the evidence relied on to support some of the Commission’s crucial findings regarding the scope of JEDEC’s patent disclosure policies and Rambus’salleged violation of those policies.” Id. Notably, the court did not address whether such conduct would violate Section 5 even if it could not support liability under the Sherman Act. The FTC has recently taken such a position in its action against Negotiated Data in the March 10, 2008 Post. A copy of the slip opinion in Rambus is attached.
Apr
22
Posted by : | On : April 22, 2008
The Antitrust Division (Criminal Section) has been busy lately. On April 19, the Criminal Section obtained plea agreements in two separate investigations. Today, the Criminal Section announced the unsealing of an indictment in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. The indictment alleges that defendants agreed to have one company withdraw from bidding to supply TACOM night vision goggles to a military procurement unit for Iraq. The indictment charges wire fraud, conspiracy to commit wire fraud and money laundering. Notably absent is a charge for violating Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The failure to charge such an offense usually indicates that no actual bid was rigged. The March 15, 2008 Post discusses the Criminal Section’s spotty trial record over the last year.
Apr
18
Posted by : | On : April 18, 2008
Today, an Italian executive agreed to plead guilty for his involvement in the Marine Hose Cartel. His plea agreement includes incarceration of one year and one day and a $20,000 fine. In addition, a Long Island defense contractor agreed to plead guilty to bid rigging and a conspiracy to commit wire fraud for his participation in a conspiracy to rig bids on Navy contracts for straps which are used to secure munitions. His sentence was left entirely to the Court’s discretion. Most criminal cases brought by the Antitrust Divisions are resolved by plea agreements. As discussed in the March 15, 2008 Post, the trial record of the Criminal Section (Antitrust Division) has been spotty. It has lost three trials within the last year.
Apr
14
Posted by : | On : April 14, 2008
The Connecticut Supreme Court recently held that the Connecticut Attorney General may pursue “damages to its general economy caused by violations of the Connecticut Antitrust Act.” State of Connecticut v. Marsh and Mclennan Companies, Inc., SC 17861 (Ct. Apr. 15, 2008). In Marsh, the Connecticut Attorney General claimed that the bid rigging scheme orchestrated by Marsh — in which Marsh decided which insurance companies should win individual contracts and which should submit high bids — caused far reaching harm to the entire Connecticut general economy. Insurance companies that did not comply with Marsh’s demands would be cut-off from all of Marsh’s customers. The Connecticut Attorney General argued that Connecticut was particularly vulnerable to Marsh’s scheme as Connecticut is home to many insurance companies. While the Court recognized that its decision conflicted with Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 405 U.S. 251 (1972) (holding that Clayton Act does not confer standing for general economic harm), the Court observed that the relevant language of the Connecticut Antitrust Act differed from the Clayton Act. The Court noted that unlike the Clayton Act, the Connecticut Antitrust Act provides specifically that the attorney general may bring an action as parens patriae “with respect to damages to the general economy of the state or any political subdivision thereof.” The Court recognized that although the state may have difficulty proving those damages, it would be improper to grant a motion to dismiss the Complaint on that basis. A copy of the opinion is attached.
Apr
10
Posted by : | On : April 10, 2008
In Madison Square Garden, L.P. v. Nat’l Hockey League, No. 07-4927-CV, 2008 WL 746524 (2d Cir. Mar. 19, 2008), the Second Circuit denied Madison Square Garden — owner of the Rangers — a preliminary injunction against threatened fines for non-compliance with the NHL’s internet policy. That policy requires that all team websites had to be migrated to a common technology platform managed by the NHL and linked to the NHL’s website. When threatened, MSG brought suit seeking preliminary and permanent injunctive relief based on alleged violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act and the Donnelly Act. The Southern District of New York denied MSG’s motion for a preliminary injunction and the Second Circuit affirmed holding that “MSG failed to establish a likelihood of success on the merits or sufficiently serious questions” on the merits. Id. at *2. The Second Circuit refused to apply a “quick look” because “the likelihood of anticompetitive effects is not] so obvious that ‘an observed with even a rudimentary understanding of economics could conclude that the arrangements in question would have an anticompetitive effect on customers and markets.'” Id. (citations omitted). In applying the rule of reason, the Second Circuit held that “MSG did not show that the NHL’s website ban has had an actual adverse effect on competition in the relevant market. Nor did MSG demonstrate that the many procompetitive benefits of the NHL’s restriction could be achieved through an alternative means that is less restrictive of competition. While there will certainly be substantive issues for the district court to address on the merits-for example, how the antitrust laws apply to the NHL as a sports league, and what the relevant market is in this case-the district court’s conclusion that preliminary injunctive relief was unwarranted falls well within the range of permissible decisions, and did not constitute an abuse of discretion.” Id. This case illustrates the difficulty of a sports team’s ability to challenge league action which benefits the league collectively. It should be noted, however, that NHL is unlikely to receive immunity under the Copperweld doctrine. See, e.g., Nat’l Hockey League Players Ass’n v. Plymouth Whalers Hockey Club, 419 F.3d 462 (6th Cir. 2005) (“courts considering the actions of professional sports leagues have found the leagues to be joint ventures whose members act in concert (i.e., agree ) to promulgate league rules, rather than one solitary acting unit”).
Apr
08
Posted by : | On : April 8, 2008
On March 24, 2008, the United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted partial summary judgment and dismissed plaintiffs’ challenge to the Star Network’s fixed interchanges fees that was based on a per se violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. See In re ATM Fee Antitrust Litig., No. C 04-02676 CRB, 2008 WL 793876 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2008). This action challenges the fixed fee that the Star Network (through its members) pays to the owner of the ATM used by the cardholder. The court applied the rule of reason because the fixed fee is “reasonably necessary to the legitimate cooperative aspects of the venture.” Id. at *10 (citation omitted). The court concluded that fixed nature of “the fee promotes cooperation between the venture’s members and cannot be set individually. Under the circumstances, that is all Defendants must show to avoid a per se analysis.” Id. The court, however, certified the question for interlocutory appeal because there is “serious doctrinal confusion over the proper analysis of cooperative arrangements among competitors.” Id. at 12 (citation omitted).
Apr
03
Posted by : | On : April 3, 2008
On March 28, 2008, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed the grant of class certification in In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Export Antitrust Litigation, Nos. 07-2257, 07-2258, 07-2259, 2008 WL (1st Cir. Mar. 28, 2008). In that case, plaintiffs alleged a conspiracy among car manufacturers — a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act — to discourage U.S. customers from purchasing cars in Canada — which were cheaper at the time due to favorable exchange rates — for their use in the U.S. The manufacturers allegedly used a variety of mechanisms to discourage this customer practice such as refusing to honor warranties on Canadian cars. The United States District Court for the District of Maine certified two classes — (1) injunctive relief class under Section 16 of the Clayton Act and (2) damages class under various state antitrust and consumer protection laws. Defendants argued that plaintiffs’ claim for injunctive relief was moot because there is no longer a “realistic threat” of future harm. As a result of the weak dollar, there is no longer a realistic threat that manufacturers will conspire to keep consumers from importing cars from Canada. The Third Circuit agreed and reversed class certification on the injunctive relief claim with instructions to dismiss that claim. The Third Circuit also agreed with the District Court’s treatment of the damages class — that plaintiffs should have more time to develop their theories to support class certification. The Third Circuit, nevertheless, vacated the preliminary grant of class certification because it was concerned that subject matter jurisdiction no longer existed. With the federal claim now dismissed, there would have to be an independent basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction over the damages claims under state law. The District Court was instructed to determine if jurisdiction existed.