Jan

19

Posted by : Matthew Wild | On : January 19, 2011

On January 11, 2011, Bioelements and the California Attorney General entered into a consent decree that enjoins Bioelements from entering into any agreements with retailers and distributors concerning what price they may charge for Bioelements’ products and to send notice to all retailers and distributors that any such polices are immediately rescinded.  The action was brought in California Superior Court under the Cartwright Act, which the California Attorney General has interpreted to provide per se treatment for resale price maintenance in contrast to Section 1 of the Sherman Act after Leegin.  See March 12, 2010 Post.  Notably, the injunction extends to all of Biolelements’ transactions even if they take place outside of California.  Bioelements also had to pay $51,000 in fines and expenses.  This action is a cautionary tale that companies cannot rely on Leegin that resale price maintenance will be subject to lenient rule of reason treatment.  A number of state attorneys general have brought resale price maintenance actions under their state laws and Maryland amended its antitrust law expressly to prohibit resale price maintenance.

Mar

06

Posted by : Matthew Wild | On : March 6, 2009

Today the FTC announced a settlement with Whole Foods that requires Whole Foods to divest 32 supermarkets in 17 geographic markets.  The FTC also required to Whole Foods to transfer Wild Oats’ intellectual property, including the “Wild Oats” name.  The divestiture, which will have to be an FTC approved buyer, is intended to restore competition between these stores that was adversely affected by the acquisition.  The FTC press release, agreement containing consent order and analysis to aid public comment are attached — FTC Press Release (Whole Foods), Whole Foods Consent Order, Whole Foods Analysis to Aid Public Comment.

The remedy in this case illustrates how rescission rather than divestiture is rare.  The preference is to put the assets in the hands of a firm that is eager to run the business as opposed to a firm seeking to exit.  Thus, it is in the seller’s interest to force consummation of the transaction as soon as legitimately possible.  (Note that there are certain limited circumstances that will justify rescission where although legal, the parties gamed the system, see, e.g., FTC v. Elders Grain, 868 F.2d 901 (7th Cir. 1989 (Posner, J.)).

This merger has resulted in considerable litigation.  Whole Foods defeated the FTC federal action for a preliminary injunction.   That decision was reversed (see July 29, 2008 Post).  Then on Whole Foods’ application for rehearing en banc, the original panel amended its decision to make clear that one judge did not join the opinion reversing the order below.  With one judge dissenting, there was no opinion of the Court, which would have been binding on future panels, and thus there was no need for en banc review (see December 1, 2008 Post).  The FTC had also imposed a harsh expedited schedule for its administrative proceeding and took the unusual step of appointing an FTC commissioner as the presiding judge.  Whole Foods unsuccessfully challenged this process as a denial of due process in a plenary lawsuit it brought in federal court (see December 11, 2008 Post).

Dec

22

Posted by : Matthew Wild | On : December 22, 2008

Antitrust Division’s press release:

“WASHINGTON — Two related investment funds will pay civil penalties totaling $800,000 to settle charges that they violated premerger reporting requirements, the Department of Justice announced today.

The Department’s Antitrust Division, at the request of the Federal Trade Commission, filed a civil lawsuit today in U.S. District Court in Washington, D.C., against ESL Partners L.P. and ZAM Holdings L.P. for violating the notification requirements of the Hart-Scott-Rodino (HSR) Act of 1976. At the same time, the Department filed a proposed settlement that, if approved by the court, will settle the charges. Under the terms of the settlement, ESL Partners has agreed to pay $525,000, and ZAM Holdings $275,000, in civil penalties.

ESL Partners, based in Greenwich, Conn., and ZAM Holdings, based in New York City, are investment funds with holdings in numerous companies. The investment decisions for both ESL Partners and ZAM Holdings were made by RBS Partners, of Greenwich.

According to the complaint, ESL Partners and ZAM Holdings failed to comply with the antitrust premerger notification requirements of the HSR Act before acquiring voting securities of AutoZone Inc., based in Memphis, Tenn., in September and October of 2004. As a result of these acquisitions, ESL Partners and ZAM Holdings each held AutoZone voting securities valued in excess of the $50 million HSR reporting threshold then in effect. The complaint alleges that ESL Partners was in violation of the HSR Act from Sept. 28, 2004, through Feb. 28, 2005, and that ZAM Holdings was in violation from Oct. 12, 2004, through March 2, 2005.

The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act of 1976, an amendment to the Clayton Act, imposes notification and waiting period requirements on individuals and companies over a certain size before they consummate acquisitions resulting in holding stock or assets above a certain value. The violations occurred when the HSR reporting threshold was $50 million. Since March 2005, the threshold has been adjusted annually to reflect changes in gross national product.

The Act permits a federal court, in a lawsuit brought by the Department, to assess a civil penalty of up to $11,000 for each day a person or company is in violation.”

This action shows the agencies’ vigilance in enforcing compliance with the HSR Act.  Unwary investment funds can violate the HSR Act when they begin to engage in sizeable transactions.  They have done so on many occassions.  Unlike the securities laws with which they are generally familar, the HSR Act requires the filing before acquiring the outstanding securities.  It is thus important for investmnet funds to obtain antitrust compliance counseling.

May

08

Posted by : Matthew Wild | On : May 8, 2008

On May 6, 2008, the FTC granted Nine West’s petition to modify its consent decree to allow Nine West to engage in resale price maintenance with its dealers. In 2000, Nine West — a footwear manufacturer — had entered into a consent decree with the FTC and several state attorneys general to resolve allegations that it fixed the prices at which its retailers may sell its shoes. Because of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Leegin Creative Leather Products v. PSKS, 127 S.Ct. 2705 (2007), which allowed such agreements to be treated under the rule of reason rather than subject to per se condemnation, the FTC allowed Nine West to engage in resale price maintenance but did not rule that such conduct would be necessarily lawful. Rather, the consent decree requires to Nine West to provide periodic reports to the FTC of prices and output during periods when it has engaged in resale price maintenance. As a practical matter, modification of the consent decree may be bring little comfort as some state attorneys general have taken the position that resale price maintenance is still a per se violation of their antitrust statutes. Herman Miller (discussed in the March 31, 2008 post) is an example of such an application of the state antitrust antitrust laws.  Attached is the FTC’s order in Nine WestNine West (Order)


Mar

31

Posted by : Matthew Wild | On : March 31, 2008

On March 21, 2008, Herman Miller, Inc. entered into a consent decree with the attorneys general for New York, Michigan and Illinois to resolve allegations of resale price maintenance over its Aeron chair — an ergonomic desk chair. Filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, the Complaint alleged that Herman Miller used its Suggested Retail Price policy to enforce a resale price maintenance scheme over the Aeron chairs. According to the Complaint, Herman Miller coerced retailers to agree not to advertise or discount Aeron chairs below Herman Miller’s Suggested Resale Price or a pre-determined discount set by Herman Miller. The states alleged violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act and the New York, Illinois and Michigan antitrust statutes. Although this action was brought after the Supreme Court in Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 2705 (2007), held that resale price maintenance was subject to analysis under the rule of reason (and no longer a per se violation of Section 1), the Complaint pled only a per se violation. The consent decree requires Herman Miller to refrain from resale price maintenance and enforcement of its Suggested Retail Price policy for all of its products. Herman Miller also was required to pay a $750,000 fine. This case serves as a cautionary tale to manufacturers who take too much comfort from Leegin. With aggressive enforcement by state attorneys general and potential litigation by terminated retailers under more stringent state laws, manufacturers would be well advised to act unilaterally under the Colgate doctrine. They are free to terminate discounters unilaterally but should not require retailers to agree to adhere to resale prices as a condition of receiving shipments. Similarly, to reduce the chance that any termination of a discounter could be considered the product of a conspiracy between the manufacturer and other retailers, manufacturers should refuse to listen to complaints from retailers about discounting. The Herman Miller Complaint and Consent Decree are attached. Herman Miller Complaint; Herman Miller Consent Decree

Mar

24

Posted by : Matthew Wild | On : March 24, 2008

Three recent developments serve as cautionary tales to parties to prospective transactions. These actions serve to remind practitioners that there is a genuine possibility of agency action even in cases where the buyer has only a minority ownership interest in a company that competes with the target; the value of the overlapping assets represent less than one percent of the transaction’s value; and the transaction has closed without any HSR review. In Bain’s and THL Partner’s (“THL”) bid to acquire acquire Clear Channel, the Antitrust Division required, among other things, divestiture by THL Partners of its passive 14% equity interest in a company that competes with Clear Channel because it was concerned that THL would seek to reduce competition between the two parties post-merger. (See Post of February 28, 2008 and attached description). In the Cookson/Foseco transaction, the Antitrust Division required divestitures worth about $4 million out of a $1 billion transaction. Although the monetary value of the divestitures was relatively minimal, the Antitrust Division’s HSR review appears to have delayed the closing by nearly five months. (See Post of March 5, 2008). Parties should therefore understand that even smallest competitive overlap can trigger serious agency scrutiny and appreciate the attendant cost and delay resulting from a Second Request under the HSR Act. On January 25, 2008, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied Chicago Bridge’s Petition for Review of the FTC’s order requiring divestitures after Chicago Bridge acquired Pitts-Des Moines’ (“PDM”). See Chicago Bridge & Iron Co, N.V. v. FTC, No. 05-60192, 2008 WL 203802 (5th Cir., Jan. 25, 2008). Merging parties should be particularly concerned that the FTC initiated its investigation of the transaction after the HSR mandatory waiting period had expired. On September 12, 2000, Chicago Bridge and PDM made their HSR filings and the mandatory waiting expired without any HSR review by the antitrust agencies. More than 30 days after the filings (and thus after the HSR waiting period expired) but before closing, the FTC informed the parties that it had begun to investigate the potential competitive effects of the transaction. Nevertheless, in February, 2001, the parties closed the transaction, and in October 2001, the FTC issued its administrative complaint. Ultimately, Chicago Bridge was required to divest all of PDM’s assets. Notably, because the transaction closed, the Buyer — Chicago Bridge — assumed all of the antitrust risk in the transaction. Chicago Bridge paid $84 million for PDM’s assets and will have to sell them at fire sale prices. Thus, Buyers should be cautious in consummating transactions that may prove anticompetitive particularly during the pendency of an agency investigation. If the purchase agreement allows them to delay closing, they ought to consider doing so. “Buyer Beware: Consummating Non-HSR Reportable Transaction May Prove Costly In the End” (appearing in the Antitrust Litigator; attached) examines the risks that can arise from consummating a merger that turns out to be anticompetitive. Discussion(Bain&THL/Clear Channel); Buyer Beware: Consummating Non-HSR Reportable Transactions May Prove Costly in the End”

Mar

05

Posted by : Matthew Wild | On : March 5, 2008

March 4, 2008. On October 11, 2007, Cookson Group plc — a U.K. company — entered into an agreement to purchase Foseco plc – a U.K. company — for about $1 billion. Both companies manufacture isotstatically press carbon ceramic products (“CBCs”) in North America and sell them throughout the United States. CBCs are used in the continuous casting steelmaking process. The parties’ 2006 CBC sales in the U.S. were $75 million and $4 million, respectively. The Antitrust Division alleged relevant product markets narrower than CBCs generally — namely, laddle shrouds and stopper rods. The Antitrust Division alleged a relevant geographic market of North America because foreign producers are at a competitive disadvantage. They have higher delivered costs and greater lead time. Rather than providing market share and HHI information for each relevant market, the Antitrust Division simply alleged that post-merger the parties would have a combined market share in the laddle shrouds and stopper rods markets of 75% and the markets would have an HHI of more than 6000 with a delta of 700. The Antitrust Division alleged high entry barriers because of the high costs of manufacturers of other CBCs to switch to the manufacture of laddle shrouds and stopper rods in response a small but significant non-transitory price increase. Accordingly, the Antitrust Division required divestiture of the overlapping assets. This action demonstrates the Antitrust Division’s vigilance in catching small competitive overlaps. Foseco had only $4 million in annual sales of CBCs in North America. Yet the Antitrust Division caught the potential competitive harm and required a remedy. The DOJ Press Release and Competitive Impact Statement are attached. DOJ Press Release (Cookson);Competitive Impact Statement (Cookson)