Jun

21

Posted by : Matthew Wild | On : June 21, 2008

On June 9, 2008, the Sixth Circuit rejected a coach’s challenge to the NCAA’s disciplinary rules because he did not allege that the disciplinary rules implicated commercial activity or that he suffered antitrust injury. Bassett v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. 06-5795, 2008 WL 2329755 (6th Cir. June 9, 2008). The Sixth Circuit held that to state a claim under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, “there must be a commercial activity implicated.” Id. at *5. The court further held that “the appropriate inquiry is whether the rule itself is commercial, not whether the entity promulgating the rule is commercial.” Id. (citations omitted). The court then rejected the challenge because the enforcement of disciplinary rules is not a commercial activity. The court also held that plaintiff did not allege antitrust injury. To satisfy this element, the plaintiff had to allege an “anticompetitive effect on the coaching market.” Id. at *7. The coach’s exclusion based on enforcement of the disciplinary rules was insufficient to establish an antitrust injury. It should be noted that the decision contains good dicta explaining when the rule of reason as opposed the per se analysis applies and the nature of the rule of reason analysis.

Feb

25

Posted by : Matthew Wild | On : February 25, 2008

January 7, 2008.  In Kentucky Speedway, LLC v. Nat’l Ass’n of Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc., Civil Action No. 05-138 (WOB), 2008 WL 113987 (E.D.K.y. Jan. 7, 2008), the district court granted summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s Section 1 and 2 claims.   Kentucky Speedway sued because NASCAR refused to sponsor a NEXTEL race at its track.  The Court considered it a “jilted distributor” case.  It found that Kentucky Speedway failed to come forward with sufficient proof of relevant product market — an essential of element of both its Section 1 and 2 claims.   It rejected the proposed relevant markets of a sanctioning market for the NEXTEL race and a hosting market for the same race.  It granted NASCAR’s Daubert motion to exclude Kentucky Speedway’s expert because he did no study to determine the cross-elasticity of demand between NEXTEL races and other potential substitutes such as sporting events in general.  Rather, Kentucky Speedway’s expert assumed only that a Bush NASCAR race event was a potential substitute.