On March 21, 2008, Herman Miller, Inc. entered into a consent decree with the attorneys general for New York, Michigan and Illinois to resolve allegations of resale price maintenance over its Aeron chair — an ergonomic desk chair. Filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, the Complaint alleged that Herman Miller used its Suggested Retail Price policy to enforce a resale price maintenance scheme over the Aeron chairs. According to the Complaint, Herman Miller coerced retailers to agree not to advertise or discount Aeron chairs below Herman Miller’s Suggested Resale Price or a pre-determined discount set by Herman Miller. The states alleged violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act and the New York, Illinois and Michigan antitrust statutes. Although this action was brought after the Supreme Court in Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 2705 (2007), held that resale price maintenance was subject to analysis under the rule of reason (and no longer a per se violation of Section 1), the Complaint pled only a per se violation. The consent decree requires Herman Miller to refrain from resale price maintenance and enforcement of its Suggested Retail Price policy for all of its products. Herman Miller also was required to pay a $750,000 fine. This case serves as a cautionary tale to manufacturers who take too much comfort from Leegin. With aggressive enforcement by state attorneys general and potential litigation by terminated retailers under more stringent state laws, manufacturers would be well advised to act unilaterally under the Colgate doctrine. They are free to terminate discounters unilaterally but should not require retailers to agree to adhere to resale prices as a condition of receiving shipments. Similarly, to reduce the chance that any termination of a discounter could be considered the product of a conspiracy between the manufacturer and other retailers, manufacturers should refuse to listen to complaints from retailers about discounting. The Herman Miller Complaint and Consent Decree are attached. Herman Miller Complaint; Herman Miller Consent Decree
Mar
30
Posted by : March 30, 2008
| On :In United Magazine Co., Inc. v. Curtis Circulation Co., 06-3212 (2d Cir., Mar. 25, 2008), the Court affirmed summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs’ Robinson-Patman Act claims against certain defendants. This decision is significant in that it shows the difficulty for Robinson-Patman Act plaintiffs to meet the injury-to-competition requirement under Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., 546 U.S. 164, 180 (2006). In United Magazine, plaintiffs came forward with proof that defendants sold magazines to one customer on better terms than to plaintiffs. The Second Circuit held that even accepting plaintiffs’ proof as true, plaintiffs’ proof of injury was insufficient for two independent reasons. Plaintiffs failed to show that they competed head-to-head for any bids with the favored customer. Second, plaintiffs failed to show that “‘any price discrimination between’ [them] and the favored customer] was ‘of such magnitude as to affect substantially competition between’ the two competitors.” Id. at 6 (quoting Volvo Trucks, 546 U.S. at 180). The Second Circuit’s decision is attached. United Magazine v. Curtis Circulation
Mar
26
Posted by : March 26, 2008
| On :March 24, 2008. The Antitrust Division cleared the merger between XM Satellite Holdings and Sirius Satellite Radio — the only satellite radio providers. In its closing statement, the Antitrust Division concluded that it would be unlikely that the parties could raise prices post-merger. The Antitrust Division noted that the parties do not compete for current customers because the costs of equipment makes switching to the other provider impractical. The Antitrust Division concluded that relevant market for new customers would have to include alternative sources for audio entertainment in addition to satellite radio. The Antitrust Division further noted that future technology would only increase the competition faced by the parties. With respect to competition for sole source contracts with major auto manufacturers, those contracts are locked-in and there is unlikely to be any competition for those contracts for many years. Finally, the Antitrust Division noted that the transaction would result in substantial efficiencies (and cost savings) which further supported its conclusion that the transaction would not harm competition.
Mar
15
Posted by : March 15, 2008
| On :In March 2008, the Antitrust division (Criminal Section) lost two price-fixing cases. On March 7, 2008, after an 11-day trial, Judge Phyllis Hamilton of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California declared a mistrial in United States v. Swanson because of a hung jury (which voted 10-2 for acquittal). The Antitrust Division has decided not to re-try Swanson. Charles Swanson, a former U.S. executive of Hynix Semiconductor, was the only defendant to go to trial in the cartel prosecutions of DRAM manufacturers. Four corporations (Samsung, Hynix, Infineon and Elpida Memory) and 16 individuals pleaded guilty. Fines exceeded $730 million and individual prison sentences ranged from 3 to 10 months. John Barthko of Barthko Zankel Tarrant & Miller represented Swanson. On March 12, 2008, the U.K. House of Lords declined to extradite Ian Norris, the former CEO of Morgan Crucible who the Antitrust Division (Criminal Section) had indicted for price-fixing in connection with electrical carbon cartel. Price-fixing was not a crime in the U.K. at the time that Norris was indicted and, therefore, Norris was not subject to extradition for the offense. To avoid that obstacle, the Antitrust Division also charged Norris with obstruction of justice and sought his extradition on that charge. Norris is subject to further proceedings and potential extradition on the obstruction charge. He was represented by Lawrence Byrne (Linklaters LLP) in the United States and Alistair Graham (White & Case LLP) in the U.K. This is the fourth recent blow to the Antitrust Division’s Criminal Section. On November 30, 2007, the United States District Court for the District of Delaware dismissed a price-fixing indictment against Stolt-Nielsen holding that the Antitrust Division breached its amnesty agreement. See United States v. Stolt-Nielsen S.A., 524 F. Supp. 2d 609 (E.D. Penn 2007). Solt was represented by Mark Gidley and Chris Curran (White & Case LLP). On July 19, 2007, Stora Enso North America was acquitted of price-fixing in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut. The jury returned its verdict in less than two hours.
Mar
11
Posted by : March 11, 2008
| On :Dismissing complaints from Microsoft and Yahoo, the EU Competition Commission cleared Google’s acquisition of DoubleClick. The Antitrust Division (U.S. Department of Justice) had done so after completing its Hart-Scott-Rodino Act review in December 2007. According to the Associated Press, the EU noted that Microsoft, Yahoo and AOL would discipline any attempt by Google/DoubleClick to raise the prices for web-placed advertisements post-merger.
Mar
03
Posted by : March 3, 2008
| On :February 13, 2008. The FTC sued Cephalon for exclusionary conduct that is preventing generic competition with its branded drug Provigil. The FTC alleged that Cephalon settled with four different generic manufacturers. These generic manufacturers dropped their patent challenges to Provigil in exchange for cash payments. Under the vagaries of the Hatch-Waxman Act, generic entry is not possible until 180 days after one of these generic manufacturers enters the Provigil — which because their patent challenges have settled, will not be until after Provigil’s patent expires in 2012. The FTC adopted a new litigation strategy in this case. In the past, the FTC challenged these types of settlements in administrative proceedings and claimed that the basis for the “unfair method of competition” was a contract in restraint of trade — a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. However, in FTC v. Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005), the FTC’s administrative decision was reversed by the Eleventh Circuit on petition for review. The Eleventh Circuit held that a reverse patent settlement is not by itself a Section 1 violation.The FTC’s current litigation strategy avoids the implication of Schering-Plough in two respects. First, by avoiding administrative proceedings altogether and commencing the action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, the FTC avoids review by the 11th Circuit. Second, the FTC is proceeding under a different theory of liability. The alleges that Cephalon willfully maintained its monopoly over Provigil through the patent settlements in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Accordingly, Schering-Plough — a Section 1 case — is inapposite. The FTC Press Release and Complaint are attached. FTC Press Release (Cephalon), FTC Complaint (Cephalon)