Mar

06

Posted by : Matthew Wild | On : March 6, 2009

Today the FTC announced a settlement with Whole Foods that requires Whole Foods to divest 32 supermarkets in 17 geographic markets.  The FTC also required to Whole Foods to transfer Wild Oats’ intellectual property, including the “Wild Oats” name.  The divestiture, which will have to be an FTC approved buyer, is intended to restore competition between these stores that was adversely affected by the acquisition.  The FTC press release, agreement containing consent order and analysis to aid public comment are attached — FTC Press Release (Whole Foods), Whole Foods Consent Order, Whole Foods Analysis to Aid Public Comment.

The remedy in this case illustrates how rescission rather than divestiture is rare.  The preference is to put the assets in the hands of a firm that is eager to run the business as opposed to a firm seeking to exit.  Thus, it is in the seller’s interest to force consummation of the transaction as soon as legitimately possible.  (Note that there are certain limited circumstances that will justify rescission where although legal, the parties gamed the system, see, e.g., FTC v. Elders Grain, 868 F.2d 901 (7th Cir. 1989 (Posner, J.)).

This merger has resulted in considerable litigation.  Whole Foods defeated the FTC federal action for a preliminary injunction.   That decision was reversed (see July 29, 2008 Post).  Then on Whole Foods’ application for rehearing en banc, the original panel amended its decision to make clear that one judge did not join the opinion reversing the order below.  With one judge dissenting, there was no opinion of the Court, which would have been binding on future panels, and thus there was no need for en banc review (see December 1, 2008 Post).  The FTC had also imposed a harsh expedited schedule for its administrative proceeding and took the unusual step of appointing an FTC commissioner as the presiding judge.  Whole Foods unsuccessfully challenged this process as a denial of due process in a plenary lawsuit it brought in federal court (see December 11, 2008 Post).

Jan

14

Posted by : Matthew Wild | On : January 14, 2009

AT&T settled a civil contempt claim with the DOJ in connection with its failure to comply with the divestiture requirements in a consent decree governing its acquisition of Dobson Communications Corporation.  In particular, AT&T failed to keep confidential customer information relating to the businesses that had to be divested.  The Antitrust Division’s press release appears below:

WASHINGTON — AT&T Inc. has agreed to pay more than $2 million as part of a civil settlement with the Department of Justice that resolves AT&T’s alleged violations of two court orders entered in connection with AT&T’s acquisition of Dobson Communications Corporation.

The Department today filed a petition in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia asking it to find AT&T in civil contempt of a 2008 consent decree and a related court order. At the same time, the Department filed a settlement agreement and order, subject to court approval, that would resolve the Department’s concerns. The payment to the United States includes reimbursement to the government for the cost of its investigation into AT&T’s alleged violations.

“It is imperative that companies fully abide by their court-ordered obligations in order for our settlements to be effective in preserving competition and protecting consumers,” said Deborah A. Garza, Acting Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Department’s Antitrust Division. “When companies fail to comply with a court order, the Antitrust Division will take swift and certain action to ensure that companies fulfill their responsibilities.”

Under the consent decree entered by the court in March 2008, AT&T was required to divest mobile wireless telecommunications businesses in three rural service areas (RSAs)  two in Kentucky and one in Oklahoma. Pending divestiture, a management trustee was appointed to oversee the businesses to be divested. Under the consent decree and a related court order, AT&T was required to take all steps necessary to ensure that the divested businesses were operated independently of AT&T and that AT&T did not influence how they were managed. AT&T was also required to take all reasonable efforts to preserve the confidentiality of information material to the operation of the divested businesses and not give unauthorized personnel access to such information.

According to the petition filed by the Department, AT&T failed to fulfill its obligations under the two court orders. The petition alleges that AT&T failed to separate confidential customer account information of the divested businesses from its own customer records and to take other actions needed to prevent unauthorized disclosure. Consequently, AT&T personnel obtained unauthorized access to the divested businesses’ competitively sensitive customer information and in some situations used it to solicit and win away the divested businesses’ customers. The petition further alleges that AT&T, without authorization by the management trustee, waived early termination fees for several customers of the divested businesses to facilitate switching their wireless service from the divested businesses to AT&T.

Mar

24

Posted by : Matthew Wild | On : March 24, 2008

Three recent developments serve as cautionary tales to parties to prospective transactions. These actions serve to remind practitioners that there is a genuine possibility of agency action even in cases where the buyer has only a minority ownership interest in a company that competes with the target; the value of the overlapping assets represent less than one percent of the transaction’s value; and the transaction has closed without any HSR review. In Bain’s and THL Partner’s (“THL”) bid to acquire acquire Clear Channel, the Antitrust Division required, among other things, divestiture by THL Partners of its passive 14% equity interest in a company that competes with Clear Channel because it was concerned that THL would seek to reduce competition between the two parties post-merger. (See Post of February 28, 2008 and attached description). In the Cookson/Foseco transaction, the Antitrust Division required divestitures worth about $4 million out of a $1 billion transaction. Although the monetary value of the divestitures was relatively minimal, the Antitrust Division’s HSR review appears to have delayed the closing by nearly five months. (See Post of March 5, 2008). Parties should therefore understand that even smallest competitive overlap can trigger serious agency scrutiny and appreciate the attendant cost and delay resulting from a Second Request under the HSR Act. On January 25, 2008, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied Chicago Bridge’s Petition for Review of the FTC’s order requiring divestitures after Chicago Bridge acquired Pitts-Des Moines’ (“PDM”). See Chicago Bridge & Iron Co, N.V. v. FTC, No. 05-60192, 2008 WL 203802 (5th Cir., Jan. 25, 2008). Merging parties should be particularly concerned that the FTC initiated its investigation of the transaction after the HSR mandatory waiting period had expired. On September 12, 2000, Chicago Bridge and PDM made their HSR filings and the mandatory waiting expired without any HSR review by the antitrust agencies. More than 30 days after the filings (and thus after the HSR waiting period expired) but before closing, the FTC informed the parties that it had begun to investigate the potential competitive effects of the transaction. Nevertheless, in February, 2001, the parties closed the transaction, and in October 2001, the FTC issued its administrative complaint. Ultimately, Chicago Bridge was required to divest all of PDM’s assets. Notably, because the transaction closed, the Buyer — Chicago Bridge — assumed all of the antitrust risk in the transaction. Chicago Bridge paid $84 million for PDM’s assets and will have to sell them at fire sale prices. Thus, Buyers should be cautious in consummating transactions that may prove anticompetitive particularly during the pendency of an agency investigation. If the purchase agreement allows them to delay closing, they ought to consider doing so. “Buyer Beware: Consummating Non-HSR Reportable Transaction May Prove Costly In the End” (appearing in the Antitrust Litigator; attached) examines the risks that can arise from consummating a merger that turns out to be anticompetitive. Discussion(Bain&THL/Clear Channel); Buyer Beware: Consummating Non-HSR Reportable Transactions May Prove Costly in the End”

Mar

10

Posted by : Matthew Wild | On : March 10, 2008

March 4, 2008. On July 10, 2007, Altivity Packaging LLC (“Altivity”) and Graphic Packaging International, Inc. (“Graphic”) announced their plans to merge in a transaction valued at $1.75 billion. Altivity and Graphic are the first and fourth largest manufacturers (respectively) of coated recycled boxboard (“CRB”) in the United States and Canada. Post-merger, the combined firm would control 42% of the CRB supply in North America. CRB is used to make products such as cereal boxes. The Antitrust Division also alleged high barriers to entry and expansion. Accordingly, the Antitrust Division required the parties to divest 11% of their capacity to a new entrant. The Antitrust Division was satisfied that such a divestiture would replace any loss in competition resulting from the merger. The DOJ Press Release and Competitive Impact Statement are attached.  DOJ Press Release (Altivity); Competitive Impact Statement (Altivity)  This has been a very active day for the Antitrust Division. Earlier in the day, the Antitrust Division challenged the Cookson/Foseco transaction.

Mar

05

Posted by : Matthew Wild | On : March 5, 2008

March 4, 2008. On October 11, 2007, Cookson Group plc — a U.K. company — entered into an agreement to purchase Foseco plc – a U.K. company — for about $1 billion. Both companies manufacture isotstatically press carbon ceramic products (“CBCs”) in North America and sell them throughout the United States. CBCs are used in the continuous casting steelmaking process. The parties’ 2006 CBC sales in the U.S. were $75 million and $4 million, respectively. The Antitrust Division alleged relevant product markets narrower than CBCs generally — namely, laddle shrouds and stopper rods. The Antitrust Division alleged a relevant geographic market of North America because foreign producers are at a competitive disadvantage. They have higher delivered costs and greater lead time. Rather than providing market share and HHI information for each relevant market, the Antitrust Division simply alleged that post-merger the parties would have a combined market share in the laddle shrouds and stopper rods markets of 75% and the markets would have an HHI of more than 6000 with a delta of 700. The Antitrust Division alleged high entry barriers because of the high costs of manufacturers of other CBCs to switch to the manufacture of laddle shrouds and stopper rods in response a small but significant non-transitory price increase. Accordingly, the Antitrust Division required divestiture of the overlapping assets. This action demonstrates the Antitrust Division’s vigilance in catching small competitive overlaps. Foseco had only $4 million in annual sales of CBCs in North America. Yet the Antitrust Division caught the potential competitive harm and required a remedy. The DOJ Press Release and Competitive Impact Statement are attached. DOJ Press Release (Cookson);Competitive Impact Statement (Cookson)

Feb

28

Posted by : Matthew Wild | On : February 28, 2008

February 13, 2008.  On November 16, 2006, Bain Capital and Thomas H. Lee Partners (“THL”) entered into an agreement to purchase a 70% interest in Clear Channel Communications for $28 billion.  By the time that the transaction was scheduled to close, Bain and THL also would have passive equity interests in two competing radio operators – Cumulus Media Partners (“CMP”) and Univision Communications.  Notwithstanding that the equity interests would be passive and with respect to Univision would be only 14%, the Antitrust Division alleged that the overlap between these competitors would result in higher prices for radio advertising and Spanish-language radio advertising in the geographic markets in which they compete.  Accordingly, the Antitrust Division conditioned approval of the transaction on divestiture of the competing assets.  Attached is a more in depth discussion of the transaction and Antitrust Division’s competitive concerns.  Discussion(Bain&THL/Clear Channel)  The DOJ Press Release and Competitive Impact Statement also are attached.  DOJ Press Release (Clear Channel)Competitive Impact Statement (Clear Channel)