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May

04

Maryland Enacts the First Leegin Repealer Statute

Posted by : Matthew Wild | On : May 4, 2009

Category: Antitrust, Resale Price Maintenance, Rule of Reason, Section 1 (Sherman Act), State Antitrust and Consumer Protection Claims, State Attorneys General

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Maryland has amended its antitrust law to make resale price maintenance agreements per se illegal, thus overruling Leegin Creative Leather Products v. PSKS, 127 S.Ct. 2705 (2007).  In Leegin, the Supreme Court overruled Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U. S. 373 (1911), and held that a resale price maintenance agreement in which the manufacturer requires a reseller to sell at a certain price is no longer a per se violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act but instead is subject to rule of reason analysis.  Application of the rule of reason creates a burden on plaintiffs because they have to show that the restraint had an adverse effect on the relevant market and not just the price of the manufacturer’s goods that were subject to restraint.  This abrupt change in the law has been poorly received by state antitrust authorities.  As reported in the May 23, 2008 Post, 35  state attorneys general petitioned Congress to amend the Sherman Act to overrule Leegin.  And as reported in the March 31, 2009 Post, the state attorneys general of New York, Illinois and Michigan obtained a consent decree against Herman Miller in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York for resale price maintenance involving the Aeron chair.  Their position was that their state antitrust law do not recognize the departure by Leegin and still provide that resale price maintenance is a per se offense.


Mar

08

Sham Litigation Allegations Held Sufficient to Avoid Dismissal under Noerr-Pennington Doctrine

Posted by : Matthew Wild | On : March 8, 2009

Category: Antitrust, Immunity, Intellectual Property, Section 2 (Sherman Act)

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As examined in the February 17, 2009 Post, there have been a number of recent appeallte decisions reviewing successful Noerr-Pennington immunity defense assertions.   Alternative Electrodes, LLC v. EPMI, Inc., No. 08-CV-1247 (JFB)(ETB), 2009 WL 250474 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2009), provides a recent illustration of the allegations necessary to defeat that defense.
In that case, plaintiff, a medical device manufacturer, claims that its competitor filed sham patent litigation against it and other competitors and made false statements about the patent litigation to plaintiff’s customers to allow it to monopolize (or gain a dangerous probability of monopolizing) the market for electrical muscle stimulation devices used to treat difficulty swallowing.  Plaintiff alleged, among other things, “from the beginning of the patent litigation that the primary, if not sole purpose, of instigating suit was to advise customers of the pending (but meritless) litigation and attempt to drive [plaintiff] from the market.  The litigation was objectively unreasonable and was initiated in order to interfere directly with [plaintiff’s] business relationships and activities. …  The sham patent suit strategy failed.  Recognizing the frivolity of the claim in light of prior art, these Defendants completely dismissed their suit … without any penalty or payment of any kind.”  Id. at *7.  The Court held that “such allegations are sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss” based on the Noerr-Pennington immunity defense because “Plaintiff alleges that the litigation was both subjectively and objectively baseless and plausibly supports this claim with the assertion that there could be no valid patent claim due to the existence of ‘prior art.’”  Id.

Mar

06

FTC Settles Challenge to Whole Foods’ Acquisition of Wild Oats

Posted by : Matthew Wild | On : March 6, 2009

Category: Antitrust, Consent Decrees, FTC Actions, Intellectual Property, Relevant Markets, Section 7 (Clayton Act)

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Today the FTC announced a settlement with Whole Foods that requires Whole Foods to divest 32 supermarkets in 17 geographic markets.  The FTC also required to Whole Foods to transfer Wild Oats’ intellectual property, including the “Wild Oats” name.  The divestiture, which will have to be an FTC approved buyer, is intended to restore competition between these stores that was adversely affected by the acquisition.  The FTC press release, agreement containing consent order and analysis to aid public comment are attached — FTC Press Release (Whole Foods), Whole Foods Consent Order, Whole Foods Analysis to Aid Public Comment.

The remedy in this case illustrates how rescission rather than divestiture is rare.  The preference is to put the assets in the hands of a firm that is eager to run the business as opposed to a firm seeking to exit.  Thus, it is in the seller’s interest to force consummation of the transaction as soon as legitimately possible.  (Note that there are certain limited circumstances that will justify rescission where although legal, the parties gamed the system, see, e.g., FTC v. Elders Grain, 868 F.2d 901 (7th Cir. 1989 (Posner, J.)).

This merger has resulted in considerable litigation.  Whole Foods defeated the FTC federal action for a preliminary injunction.   That decision was reversed (see July 29, 2008 Post).  Then on Whole Foods’ application for rehearing en banc, the original panel amended its decision to make clear that one judge did not join the opinion reversing the order below.  With one judge dissenting, there was no opinion of the Court, which would have been binding on future panels, and thus there was no need for en banc review (see December 1, 2008 Post).  The FTC had also imposed a harsh expedited schedule for its administrative proceeding and took the unusual step of appointing an FTC commissioner as the presiding judge.  Whole Foods unsuccessfully challenged this process as a denial of due process in a plenary lawsuit it brought in federal court (see December 11, 2008 Post).

Feb

26

The Supreme Court Unanimously Rejects Price Squeeze Claim

Posted by : Matthew Wild | On : February 26, 2009

Category: Antitrust, Section 2 (Sherman Act)

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Yesterday, the Supreme Court in Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. Linkline Communications, Inc., No. 07-512 (Feb. 25, 2009) (LinkLine decision  here) unanimously rejected a price squeeze claim alleged under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.  Pac Bell is a DSL transport service and retail service provided.  Linkline, an independent DSL service provider, competed with Pac Bell on the retail level but needed to purchase Pac Bell’s transport service to provide DSL to its retail customers.  Linkline alleged that Pac Bell engaged in a price squeeze by charging Linkline too high a wholesale price for DSL transport service and charging its retail customers too low a price on DSL service.  The Court rejected this claim because (1) Pac Bell had no obligation to deal with Linkline and thus the prices it charged to Linkline are of no consequence and (2) Pac Bell was not alleged to have engaged in predatory pricing at the retail level — i.e., charging prices below  cost with a dangerous probability that it can raise its prices later and recoup its losses.  Chief Justice Roberts aptly summarized the Court’s rationale, “Trinko holds that a defendant with no antitrust duty to deal with its rivals has no duty to deal under terms and conditions preferred by those rivals.  Brooke Group hold that low prices are only actionable under the Sherman Act when prices are below cost and there is a dangerous probability that the predator will be able to recoup the profits it loses from low prices.  In this case, plaintiffs have not stated a duty-to-deal claim under Trinko or a predatory pricing claim under Brooke Group.  They nontheless tried to join a wholesale claim that cannot succeed with a retail claim that cannot succeed and alchemize them into a new form of antitrust  liability never before recognized by this Court.  We decline the invitation to recognize such claims.  Two wrong claims do not make one that is right.”

The background to this case is unusual.  The June 3, 2008 Post reported a rare disagreement between the DOJ’s Antitrust Division and FTC over whether to grant certiorari.  The Antitrust Division filed a brief supporting certiorari (which the FTC declined to join) and the FTC issued a statement explaining why certiorari should be denied.  It also seems as if the Supreme Court reached out to decide this case as Linkline argued that it abandoned its price squeeze claim and wanted to pursue a predatory pricing claim under Brooke Group.  The Court rejected the mootness argument and believed that the issues were adequately explored to make a reasoned decision based on the amici’s submissions.

Feb

24

The Supreme Court Seeks Solicitor General’s View of Whether to Grant Certiorari in a Case that Shielded the NFL’s Licensing Arrangement from Antitrust Scrutiny

Posted by : Matthew Wild | On : February 24, 2009

Category: Antitrust, Immunity, Intellectual Property, Section 1 (Sherman Act), Section 2 (Sherman Act)

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The September 4, 2008 Post examined a recent Seventh Circuit decision that held that the NFL was immune under the antitrust laws for its exclusive licensing of team logos on headwear to Reebok.  American Needle Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, No. 07-4006, 2008 WL 3822782 (7th Cir. Aug. 18, 2008).  The Supreme Court has just expressed an interest in reviewing the case.  It has “invited” the Solicitor General to “file briefs expressing the views of the United States.”  This case is also unusual because both parties sought Supreme Court review.  Although it won below, the NFL sought Supreme Court review so that its potential antitrust liability for league activity will no longer depend on which Circuit it is sued.

Feb

23

The Tenth Circuit Rejects Deer Valley Ski Rental Store’s Claims for Monopolization and Attempted Monopolization against Ski Resort

Posted by : Matthew Wild | On : February 23, 2009

Category: Antitrust, Relevant Markets, Section 2 (Sherman Act)

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On February 18, 2009, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed dismissal of a complaint filed by a ski rental store against the Deer Valley, Utah ski resort operator with its own ski rental operation alleging monopolization and attempted monopolization in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.  Christy Sports LLC v. Deer Valley Resort Co., Ltd., No. 07-4198 (10th Cir. Feb. 18, 2009) (Christy Sports v. Deer Valley Resort Decision).  Plaintiff had sought to prevent enforcement of a restrictive covenant governing its use of property sold by the ski resort operator.  When the ski resort operator sold the parcel of land on which the ski rental store operates, it imposed a restrictive covenant in the deed only permitting the operation of a ski rental business with its permission.  For years, the ski resort operator permitted plaintiff to operate accepting a share of the profits in return.  Preferring to capture that business in the future, the ski resort operator sought to enforce the restrictive covenant and put the ski rental store out of business.  The Tenth Circuit rejected plaintiff’s claims under Section 2 of the Sherman Act for two independent reasons.  First, the Court rejected plaintiff’s relevant product market definition of ski rental stores.  Rather the Court held that the relevant market was the skiing experience.  It reasoned that skiers do not come to the area to rent skis and that ski rentals are just one component of the skiing experience that they seek.  It should be of no consequence that the ski resort operator charges more for ski rentals and as a consequence, less for e.g., lift tickets.  Second, the Court held that there were no allegations of anticompetitive conduct.  The antitrust laws do not forbid a business from imposing a restrictive covenant on a neighboring parcel of land to avoid competition and justify its investment in entry.  Accordingly, nothing precludes the enforcement of an otherwise permissible restrictive covenant.

Feb

17

The Second and Ninth Circuits Uphold Antitrust Immunity in Three Recent Cases

Posted by : Matthew Wild | On : February 17, 2009

Category: Antitrust, Immunity, New York Cases, Section 1 (Sherman Act)

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In January 2009, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed a district decision granting a motion to dismiss an action alleging that defendants “conspired to influence the FCC.”  The Court held that such activity cannot give rise to antitrust liability under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.  Kahn v. iBiquity Digital Corp., No. 07-0475-cv, 2009 WL 102810 (2d Cir. Jan. 15, 2009).  That doctrine provides immunity for, among other things, lobbying the government including agencies which is precisely what the defendants were alleged to have done.  In another case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld application of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine in Kaiser Health Foundation, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc., Nos. 06-55687, 06-55748, 2009 WL 69269 (Jan. 13, 2009).  This time defendant’s commencement of litigation against generic drug manufacturers was protected.  The Noerr-Pennington doctrine also shields litigation as a basis for antitrust liability unless it is “sham” litigation.  The Ninth Circuit affirmed dismissal of the monopolization claims based on Abbott’s seventeen patent infringement lawsuits against generic drug manufacturers noting that it could hardly be sham litigation when Abbott prevailed in seven of them and Abbott “had a plausible argument on which it could have prevailed” in the other ten suits.  Id. at *13.  In Wolfe v. City of Anaheim, No. 07-56031, 2008 WL 542079 (9th Cir. Dec. 31, 2008), the Ninth Circuit affirmed dismissal on summary judgment based on the Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984, 15 U.S.C. section 35(a).  That statute immunizes municipalities from antitrust damages.  Plaintiff had sought to recover damages from the City of Anaheim for alleged wrongful denial of a taxicab franchise under, inter alia, the Sherman Act.  The statute clearly precluded such liability.

Feb

06

The Second Circuit Refuses to Enforce Bar to Collective Action Provision in Arbitration Agreements

Posted by : Matthew Wild | On : February 6, 2009

Category: Antitrust, New York Cases, Section 1 (Sherman Act)

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In a significant victory to antitrust victims, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit refused to enforce a bar in arbitration contracts that prohibited collective actions.  In re American Express Merchants’ Litigation, No. 06-1871-cv (2d Cir. Jan. 30, 2009) (Amercian Express Merchants Litigation attached).  Plaintiffs were merchants who alleged that American Express tied acceptance of its charge card to its credit cards – it required merchants to accept both cards rather than allowing them to choose to accept only the charge card.  The merchants claim that this tying scheme allowed American Express to charge them supracompetitive fees on American Express credit card purchases in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.  The merchant agreements had an arbitration provision, which also barred class or collective actions whether in arbitration or otherwise.  The Second Circuit held that such clauses are unenforceable where as here the amount of the potential claims are so small that it would effectively preclude plaintiffs from bringing antitrust actions or arbitration proceedings on their own.  The Court expressly chose not to address whether such restrictions are per se unenforceable in antitrust actions.

Jan

14

AT&T Settles Civil Contempt Claim with the DOJ for $2 Million

Posted by : Matthew Wild | On : January 14, 2009

Category: Antitrust, Consent Decrees, Government Investigations, Mergers and Acquisitions, U.S. Department of Justice (Antitrust Division)

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AT&T settled a civil contempt claim with the DOJ in connection with its failure to comply with the divestiture requirements in a consent decree governing its acquisition of Dobson Communications Corporation.  In particular, AT&T failed to keep confidential customer information relating to the businesses that had to be divested.  The Antitrust Division’s press release appears below:

WASHINGTON — AT&T Inc. has agreed to pay more than $2 million as part of a civil settlement with the Department of Justice that resolves AT&T’s alleged violations of two court orders entered in connection with AT&T’s acquisition of Dobson Communications Corporation.

The Department today filed a petition in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia asking it to find AT&T in civil contempt of a 2008 consent decree and a related court order. At the same time, the Department filed a settlement agreement and order, subject to court approval, that would resolve the Department’s concerns. The payment to the United States includes reimbursement to the government for the cost of its investigation into AT&T’s alleged violations.

“It is imperative that companies fully abide by their court-ordered obligations in order for our settlements to be effective in preserving competition and protecting consumers,” said Deborah A. Garza, Acting Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Department’s Antitrust Division. “When companies fail to comply with a court order, the Antitrust Division will take swift and certain action to ensure that companies fulfill their responsibilities.”

Under the consent decree entered by the court in March 2008, AT&T was required to divest mobile wireless telecommunications businesses in three rural service areas (RSAs)  two in Kentucky and one in Oklahoma. Pending divestiture, a management trustee was appointed to oversee the businesses to be divested. Under the consent decree and a related court order, AT&T was required to take all steps necessary to ensure that the divested businesses were operated independently of AT&T and that AT&T did not influence how they were managed. AT&T was also required to take all reasonable efforts to preserve the confidentiality of information material to the operation of the divested businesses and not give unauthorized personnel access to such information.

According to the petition filed by the Department, AT&T failed to fulfill its obligations under the two court orders. The petition alleges that AT&T failed to separate confidential customer account information of the divested businesses from its own customer records and to take other actions needed to prevent unauthorized disclosure. Consequently, AT&T personnel obtained unauthorized access to the divested businesses’ competitively sensitive customer information and in some situations used it to solicit and win away the divested businesses’ customers. The petition further alleges that AT&T, without authorization by the management trustee, waived early termination fees for several customers of the divested businesses to facilitate switching their wireless service from the divested businesses to AT&T.

Jan

13

FTC Seeks Hold Separate Order on Remand Against Whole Foods

Posted by : Matthew Wild | On : January 13, 2009

Category: Antitrust, FTC Actions, Mergers and Acquisitions, Section 7 (Clayton Act)

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On January 12, 2009, the FTC sought a hold separate order against Whole Foods on remand from the D.C. Circuit’s reversal of the lower court’s denial of a preliminary injunction.  During the pendency of its administrative proceeding, the FTC seeks an order that enjoins Whole Foods from further integration of Wild Oats’ assets, rebranding of former Wild Oats stores and appointment of an independent trustee and management team to run the former Wild Oats stores. (Whole Foods Remand)   It is questionable whether such relief would be effective to restore competition if for example, Wild Oats lost key employees, a loyal customer base and a distribution network.  Prior coverage of the Whole Foods litigation appears on the July 29, 2008, December 1, 2008 and December 11, 2008 Posts.  This remand proposal is likely to spark Whole Foods to seek expedited relief in its lawsuit against the FTC challenging the fairness and integrity of the FTC’s administrative process.  (See December 11, 2008 Post)  On December 12, 2008, the FTC has moved to dismiss the Complaint in that action contending that only a U.S. Court of Appeals has subject matter jurisdiction because Congress only granted those courts the power to review the FTC’s actions.  (FTC Motion to Dismiss)