In Madison Square Garden, L.P. v. Nat’l Hockey League, No. 07-4927-CV, 2008 WL 746524 (2d Cir. Mar. 19, 2008), the Second Circuit denied Madison Square Garden — owner of the Rangers — a preliminary injunction against threatened fines for non-compliance with the NHL’s internet policy. That policy requires that all team websites had to be migrated to a common technology platform managed by the NHL and linked to the NHL’s website. When threatened, MSG brought suit seeking preliminary and permanent injunctive relief based on alleged violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act and the Donnelly Act. The Southern District of New York denied MSG’s motion for a preliminary injunction and the Second Circuit affirmed holding that “MSG failed to establish a likelihood of success on the merits or sufficiently serious questions” on the merits. Id. at *2. The Second Circuit refused to apply a “quick look” because “the likelihood of anticompetitive effects is not] so obvious that ‘an observed with even a rudimentary understanding of economics could conclude that the arrangements in question would have an anticompetitive effect on customers and markets.'” Id. (citations omitted). In applying the rule of reason, the Second Circuit held that “MSG did not show that the NHL’s website ban has had an actual adverse effect on competition in the relevant market. Nor did MSG demonstrate that the many procompetitive benefits of the NHL’s restriction could be achieved through an alternative means that is less restrictive of competition. While there will certainly be substantive issues for the district court to address on the merits-for example, how the antitrust laws apply to the NHL as a sports league, and what the relevant market is in this case-the district court’s conclusion that preliminary injunctive relief was unwarranted falls well within the range of permissible decisions, and did not constitute an abuse of discretion.” Id. This case illustrates the difficulty of a sports team’s ability to challenge league action which benefits the league collectively. It should be noted, however, that NHL is unlikely to receive immunity under the Copperweld doctrine. See, e.g., Nat’l Hockey League Players Ass’n v. Plymouth Whalers Hockey Club, 419 F.3d 462 (6th Cir. 2005) (“courts considering the actions of professional sports leagues have found the leagues to be joint ventures whose members act in concert (i.e., agree ) to promulgate league rules, rather than one solitary acting unit”).
Apr
10
Posted by : | On : April 10, 2008
Apr
08
Posted by : | On : April 8, 2008
On March 24, 2008, the United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted partial summary judgment and dismissed plaintiffs’ challenge to the Star Network’s fixed interchanges fees that was based on a per se violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. See In re ATM Fee Antitrust Litig., No. C 04-02676 CRB, 2008 WL 793876 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2008). This action challenges the fixed fee that the Star Network (through its members) pays to the owner of the ATM used by the cardholder. The court applied the rule of reason because the fixed fee is “reasonably necessary to the legitimate cooperative aspects of the venture.” Id. at *10 (citation omitted). The court concluded that fixed nature of “the fee promotes cooperation between the venture’s members and cannot be set individually. Under the circumstances, that is all Defendants must show to avoid a per se analysis.” Id. The court, however, certified the question for interlocutory appeal because there is “serious doctrinal confusion over the proper analysis of cooperative arrangements among competitors.” Id. at 12 (citation omitted).
Apr
03
Posted by : | On : April 3, 2008
On March 28, 2008, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed the grant of class certification in In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Export Antitrust Litigation, Nos. 07-2257, 07-2258, 07-2259, 2008 WL (1st Cir. Mar. 28, 2008). In that case, plaintiffs alleged a conspiracy among car manufacturers — a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act — to discourage U.S. customers from purchasing cars in Canada — which were cheaper at the time due to favorable exchange rates — for their use in the U.S. The manufacturers allegedly used a variety of mechanisms to discourage this customer practice such as refusing to honor warranties on Canadian cars. The United States District Court for the District of Maine certified two classes — (1) injunctive relief class under Section 16 of the Clayton Act and (2) damages class under various state antitrust and consumer protection laws. Defendants argued that plaintiffs’ claim for injunctive relief was moot because there is no longer a “realistic threat” of future harm. As a result of the weak dollar, there is no longer a realistic threat that manufacturers will conspire to keep consumers from importing cars from Canada. The Third Circuit agreed and reversed class certification on the injunctive relief claim with instructions to dismiss that claim. The Third Circuit also agreed with the District Court’s treatment of the damages class — that plaintiffs should have more time to develop their theories to support class certification. The Third Circuit, nevertheless, vacated the preliminary grant of class certification because it was concerned that subject matter jurisdiction no longer existed. With the federal claim now dismissed, there would have to be an independent basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction over the damages claims under state law. The District Court was instructed to determine if jurisdiction existed.
Mar
26
Posted by : | On : March 26, 2008
March 24, 2008. The Antitrust Division cleared the merger between XM Satellite Holdings and Sirius Satellite Radio — the only satellite radio providers. In its closing statement, the Antitrust Division concluded that it would be unlikely that the parties could raise prices post-merger. The Antitrust Division noted that the parties do not compete for current customers because the costs of equipment makes switching to the other provider impractical. The Antitrust Division concluded that relevant market for new customers would have to include alternative sources for audio entertainment in addition to satellite radio. The Antitrust Division further noted that future technology would only increase the competition faced by the parties. With respect to competition for sole source contracts with major auto manufacturers, those contracts are locked-in and there is unlikely to be any competition for those contracts for many years. Finally, the Antitrust Division noted that the transaction would result in substantial efficiencies (and cost savings) which further supported its conclusion that the transaction would not harm competition.
Mar
03
Posted by : | On : March 3, 2008
February 13, 2008. The FTC sued Cephalon for exclusionary conduct that is preventing generic competition with its branded drug Provigil. The FTC alleged that Cephalon settled with four different generic manufacturers. These generic manufacturers dropped their patent challenges to Provigil in exchange for cash payments. Under the vagaries of the Hatch-Waxman Act, generic entry is not possible until 180 days after one of these generic manufacturers enters the Provigil — which because their patent challenges have settled, will not be until after Provigil’s patent expires in 2012. The FTC adopted a new litigation strategy in this case. In the past, the FTC challenged these types of settlements in administrative proceedings and claimed that the basis for the “unfair method of competition” was a contract in restraint of trade — a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. However, in FTC v. Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005), the FTC’s administrative decision was reversed by the Eleventh Circuit on petition for review. The Eleventh Circuit held that a reverse patent settlement is not by itself a Section 1 violation.The FTC’s current litigation strategy avoids the implication of Schering-Plough in two respects. First, by avoiding administrative proceedings altogether and commencing the action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, the FTC avoids review by the 11th Circuit. Second, the FTC is proceeding under a different theory of liability. The alleges that Cephalon willfully maintained its monopoly over Provigil through the patent settlements in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Accordingly, Schering-Plough — a Section 1 case — is inapposite. The FTC Press Release and Complaint are attached. FTC Press Release (Cephalon), FTC Complaint (Cephalon)