Mar

10

Posted by : Matthew Wild | On : March 10, 2008

January 23, 2008. The FTC challenged anticompetitive behavior under Section 5 of the FTC Act that was not a violation of Section 1 or 2 of the Sherman Act. The FTC alleged that Negotiated Data (“N-Data”) reneged on its commitment to license its Ethernet technology to a standard-setting body on specificed terms. That commitment had induced that body to adopt N-Data’s technology as the standard. The FTC alleged that such conduct was both an “unfair method of competition” and an “unfair practice” in violation of Section 5. N-Data entered into a consent decree agreeing to abide by the licensing terms that it had originally offered. FTC Chair Majoras and Commissioner Kovacik dissented believing that Section 5 of the FTC Act does not reach such conduct. The FTC and Dissenting Statements and Analysis to Aid Public Comment are attached.FTC Statement (NData); ; Majoras Dissent (NData); Analysis to Aid Public Comment (NData)

Mar

10

Posted by : Matthew Wild | On : March 10, 2008

March 4, 2008. On July 10, 2007, Altivity Packaging LLC (“Altivity”) and Graphic Packaging International, Inc. (“Graphic”) announced their plans to merge in a transaction valued at $1.75 billion. Altivity and Graphic are the first and fourth largest manufacturers (respectively) of coated recycled boxboard (“CRB”) in the United States and Canada. Post-merger, the combined firm would control 42% of the CRB supply in North America. CRB is used to make products such as cereal boxes. The Antitrust Division also alleged high barriers to entry and expansion. Accordingly, the Antitrust Division required the parties to divest 11% of their capacity to a new entrant. The Antitrust Division was satisfied that such a divestiture would replace any loss in competition resulting from the merger. The DOJ Press Release and Competitive Impact Statement are attached.  DOJ Press Release (Altivity); Competitive Impact Statement (Altivity)  This has been a very active day for the Antitrust Division. Earlier in the day, the Antitrust Division challenged the Cookson/Foseco transaction.

Mar

05

Posted by : Matthew Wild | On : March 5, 2008

March 4, 2008. On October 11, 2007, Cookson Group plc — a U.K. company — entered into an agreement to purchase Foseco plc – a U.K. company — for about $1 billion. Both companies manufacture isotstatically press carbon ceramic products (“CBCs”) in North America and sell them throughout the United States. CBCs are used in the continuous casting steelmaking process. The parties’ 2006 CBC sales in the U.S. were $75 million and $4 million, respectively. The Antitrust Division alleged relevant product markets narrower than CBCs generally — namely, laddle shrouds and stopper rods. The Antitrust Division alleged a relevant geographic market of North America because foreign producers are at a competitive disadvantage. They have higher delivered costs and greater lead time. Rather than providing market share and HHI information for each relevant market, the Antitrust Division simply alleged that post-merger the parties would have a combined market share in the laddle shrouds and stopper rods markets of 75% and the markets would have an HHI of more than 6000 with a delta of 700. The Antitrust Division alleged high entry barriers because of the high costs of manufacturers of other CBCs to switch to the manufacture of laddle shrouds and stopper rods in response a small but significant non-transitory price increase. Accordingly, the Antitrust Division required divestiture of the overlapping assets. This action demonstrates the Antitrust Division’s vigilance in catching small competitive overlaps. Foseco had only $4 million in annual sales of CBCs in North America. Yet the Antitrust Division caught the potential competitive harm and required a remedy. The DOJ Press Release and Competitive Impact Statement are attached. DOJ Press Release (Cookson);Competitive Impact Statement (Cookson)

Mar

03

Posted by : Matthew Wild | On : March 3, 2008

February 13, 2008. The FTC sued Cephalon for exclusionary conduct that is preventing generic competition with its branded drug Provigil. The FTC alleged that Cephalon settled with four different generic manufacturers. These generic manufacturers dropped their patent challenges to Provigil in exchange for cash payments. Under the vagaries of the Hatch-Waxman Act, generic entry is not possible until 180 days after one of these generic manufacturers enters the Provigil — which because their patent challenges have settled, will not be until after Provigil’s patent expires in 2012. The FTC adopted a new litigation strategy in this case. In the past, the FTC challenged these types of settlements in administrative proceedings and claimed that the basis for the “unfair method of competition” was a contract in restraint of trade — a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. However, in FTC v. Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005), the FTC’s administrative decision was reversed by the Eleventh Circuit on petition for review. The Eleventh Circuit held that a reverse patent settlement is not by itself a Section 1 violation.The FTC’s current litigation strategy avoids the implication of Schering-Plough in two respects. First, by avoiding administrative proceedings altogether and commencing the action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, the FTC avoids review by the 11th Circuit. Second, the FTC is proceeding under a different theory of liability. The alleges that Cephalon willfully maintained its monopoly over Provigil through the patent settlements in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Accordingly, Schering-Plough — a Section 1 case — is inapposite. The FTC Press Release and Complaint are attached. FTC Press Release (Cephalon), FTC Complaint (Cephalon)

Feb

28

Posted by : Matthew Wild | On : February 28, 2008

February 13, 2008.  On November 16, 2006, Bain Capital and Thomas H. Lee Partners (“THL”) entered into an agreement to purchase a 70% interest in Clear Channel Communications for $28 billion.  By the time that the transaction was scheduled to close, Bain and THL also would have passive equity interests in two competing radio operators – Cumulus Media Partners (“CMP”) and Univision Communications.  Notwithstanding that the equity interests would be passive and with respect to Univision would be only 14%, the Antitrust Division alleged that the overlap between these competitors would result in higher prices for radio advertising and Spanish-language radio advertising in the geographic markets in which they compete.  Accordingly, the Antitrust Division conditioned approval of the transaction on divestiture of the competing assets.  Attached is a more in depth discussion of the transaction and Antitrust Division’s competitive concerns.  Discussion(Bain&THL/Clear Channel)  The DOJ Press Release and Competitive Impact Statement also are attached.  DOJ Press Release (Clear Channel)Competitive Impact Statement (Clear Channel)

Feb

27

Posted by : Matthew Wild | On : February 27, 2008

February 27, 2008. Microsoft became the first company that the EU Competition Commission has fined (in its 50 year history) for non-compliance with an antitrust decree. The decree was based on the determination that Microsoft abused its dominant position. To remedy the violation, the decree required Microsoft to disclose interoperability information to developers of work group server operating servers (on reasonable terms) which would allow them to compete. The EU concluded that royalty rates which Microsoft imposed were unreasonable and therefore violated the antitrust decree. Below is a link to the proceedings against Microsoft in the EU. http://www.ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/cases/microsoft/index.html

Feb

25

Posted by : Matthew Wild | On : February 25, 2008

January 7, 2008.  In Kentucky Speedway, LLC v. Nat’l Ass’n of Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc., Civil Action No. 05-138 (WOB), 2008 WL 113987 (E.D.K.y. Jan. 7, 2008), the district court granted summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s Section 1 and 2 claims.   Kentucky Speedway sued because NASCAR refused to sponsor a NEXTEL race at its track.  The Court considered it a “jilted distributor” case.  It found that Kentucky Speedway failed to come forward with sufficient proof of relevant product market — an essential of element of both its Section 1 and 2 claims.   It rejected the proposed relevant markets of a sanctioning market for the NEXTEL race and a hosting market for the same race.  It granted NASCAR’s Daubert motion to exclude Kentucky Speedway’s expert because he did no study to determine the cross-elasticity of demand between NEXTEL races and other potential substitutes such as sporting events in general.  Rather, Kentucky Speedway’s expert assumed only that a Bush NASCAR race event was a potential substitute.

Feb

22

Posted by : Matthew Wild | On : February 22, 2008

February 22, 2008.  Two former Marsh executives (William Gilman and Edward McNenney) were convicted after a 10-month bench trial of bid rigging in violation of New York’s Donnolly Act.  They were acquitted of grand larceny and engaging in schemes to defraud.  These charges stem from Marsh’s scheme of steering business to insurers who paid Marsh the highest contingent commissions.  The case was brought by the New York State Attorney General in New York State Supreme Court, New York County.  In addition to agreeing to refrain from such conduct in the future, Marsh had paid $850 million to settle with the New York Attorney General.  Another executive pleaded guilty to engaging in a scheme to defraud in 2005.

Feb

21

Posted by : Matthew Wild | On : February 21, 2008

February 19, 2008.  The Antitrust Division conditioned approval of Thomson Corporation’s $17 billion acquisition of Reuters Group PLC on divestitures of financial datasets and licensing of related intellectual property.  Thomson and Reuters compete head-to-head in providing three types of financial data used by investment professional to make investment decision.  The Antitrust Division analyzed three relevant product markets — fundamentals data, earning estimates data and aftermarket research reports.  The parties combined market shares post-merger would have been more than 50 percent and up to 90 percent.  The Antitrust Division required Thomson to sell the relevant datasets and license its relevant intellectual property to a suitable buyer.  The consent agreement contains a hold separate provision but did not require the parties to “fix-it-first.”  The DOJ and EU Competition Commission cooperated in their investigations.  The EU required different remedies that had no bearing in the U.S.   Attached are the Antitrust Division’s press release and Competitive Impact Statement. DOJ Press Release (Thomson) Competitive Impact Statement (Thomson)